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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW  
The idea of consolidating functions is not new in the corporate world, nor is it 
new in government. Organizations often consolidate activities to achieve economies of 
scale and other efficiencies.  Examples of consolidation include mergers, acquisitions, 
collocations, shared facility utilization, strategic alliances, and so forth.  Such 
consolidations can reduce operating costs and increase potential performance for 
companies and government entities alike.  Recently, due to decisions in the Department 
of Defense (DoD) Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) process, military 
consolidations increased in frequency across the United States. 
Mergers and acquisitions occur with incredible frequency throughout the world.  
They occur at every level of business, at every locality, and in virtually every industry.  
One estimate from 2004 stated that 30,000 mergers and acquisitions were completed 
globally that year (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006).  This estimate equates to one merger 
or acquisition every 18 minutes.  More startling than the frequency with which mergers 
and acquisitions occurred is that the estimated value of these 30,000 transactions was 
$1.9 trillion, which exceeds the gross domestic product (GDP) of nearly all countries 
(Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006).   
Joint purchasing, which is purchasing cooperatively with another organization 
either through consolidation or cooperative behavior without consolidation, can lead to a 
competitive advantage for merging firms by reducing redundancy, consolidating 
purchases to gain economies of scale, and combining the experience and skill of multiple 
organizations to improve corporate knowledge.  The automobile industry has several 
examples of joint purchasing agreements that are not consolidations; specifically, General 
Motors (GM) and Fiat purchase automotive supplies cooperatively while Renault and 
Nissan are similarly allied (Midler, Neffa, & Monnet, 2002).  Private industry abounds 
with other than automobile examples of both successful and unsuccessful consolidations.   
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Governmental organizations often attempt to mimic the successes of industry where 
possible in order to meet regulatory requirements and fiscal constraints, and consolidation 
is no exception.   
One example of consolidation is joint basing, where installations from multiple 
Services in close geographical proximity combine their support functions under the lead 
of one service.  Joint basing affects all functions on the installation to some degree, but 
contracting organizations face unique implementation issues.  This effect remains 
especially true in instances of interservice joint basing where process changes occur to 
some degree at every level.  Benchmarking the changes to the base-level contracting 
unit’s governance structures, processes, and communication that occurred in recent joint-
basing actions should reveal best practices and indicators for potential improvement.  The 
best practices and indicators identified would apply directly to any future efforts to 
consolidate contracting activities from different military departments.   
Because no extensively researched literature exists explaining the occurrences of 
contracting units in joint basing, this research is exploratory.  Using a case study 
methodology, we conducted a comparative examination to explore consolidations of 
procurement at Joint Base San Antonio (JBSA) and Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM).  
The United States Air Force leads the JBSA mission, and the United States Army leads 
the JBLM mission.  Comparing and contrasting the way JBSA and JBLM operate 
provided a clearer understanding of how the consolidation of the contracting function 
changed the units and its customers.   
Utilizing an exploratory case study approach, we sought in this research to 
identify specific factors that contribute to the organizational successes of joint-base 
contracting.  The goal was to unveil how joint basing has changed contracting at the base-
level.  In this research we sought to find changes that occurred because of joint basing in 
the contracting units.  Then, we sorted those changes in terms of structure, processes, or 
communication.  The final step identifies the changes as either strengths or weaknesses.  
In this analysis—based on the contingency theory of organizational design, mergers and 
acquisition literature, change management, and strategic sourcing—we also reveal 
barriers to consolidation.  Using previously identified successes in these related bodies of 
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literature, we aim to find potential improvement for JBSA and JBLM.  By documenting 
changes in these specific organizations, we hope to guide the successful execution of 
future joint base contracting throughout the Air Force, DoD, and other federal, state, and 
local government organizations. 
B. BACKGROUND 
JBLM and JBSA were created as the result of the 2005 DoD BRAC process, 
which sought to optimize efficiency and warfighting capabilities, maximize the joint 
utilization of resources, and ensure that the current defense infrastructure supported the 
post-Cold War force structure (U.S. Army Base Realignment and Closure Division, 
2006).  San Antonio, Texas has a history of consolidated functions even before the 
BRAC as seen in the examples of the San Antonio Real Property Maintenance Agency 
(SARPMA) and the San Antonio Contracting Center (SACC) which occurred in the 
1970s and 1980s (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 1989).  SARPA and SACC 
are valuable examples which occurred over three decades prior to the BRAC joint basing 
initiative, but served very much the same purpose on a much smaller level.  Additionally, 
they give some insight as to the effectiveness of function consolidation between bases.  In 
this section we give a brief history of the creation and subsequent disestablishment of 
SARPMA and SACC, the BRAC process, the results of the various BRACs, and the 
estimated cost savings from the realignments and closures. 
DoD created SARPMA and SACC with the Air Force as the lead after completing 
a cost study in 1975 indicating that over $2 million (in 1975 dollars) could be saved 
annually by consolidating the contracting services at five DoD installations in San 
Antonio, Texas (GAO, 1989).  The five installations were the Air Force installations of 
Brooks Air Force Base (AFB), Kelly AFB, Lackland AFB, and Randolph AFB, and the 
Army installation of Fort Sam Houston.  Standup of SARPMA and SACC began shortly 
after the cost study was completed, and both organizations were stood up by October of 
1978 (GAO, 1989).  They operated for nearly a decade before closing. 
Less than 10 years after their creation, studies by both the DoD and Air Force 
indicated projected savings were not being realized and installation commanders wanted 
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more direct control over these activities (GAO, 1989).  By October 1, 1989 both 
installations had been disestablished and 97% of the employees were reassigned to their 
functions at the different installations in San Antonio versus the consolidated units 
(GAO, 1989).  Years later, a 1996 GAO report noted DoD and the Services find it 
difficult to track monetary savings for interservice consolidations.  It went on to say that 
there is even a general resistance by commanders because it forces them to release 
control of their mission to other individuals or organizations (GAO, 1996).  A report from 
1983 directly stated, “SARPMA is probably not achieving the primary purpose of 
consolidation . . . lower cost to the government” (Massey, 1983).  In the end, a Defense 
Management Report Decision concluded that determining savings was not possible for a 
variety of reasons (GAO, 1996).  It went on to say that although projected savings may 
not have occurred, its failure should not be blamed on consolidation alone (GAO, 1996).  
Years later, the BRAC process of joint basing reused the consolidation ideas of 
SARPMA and SACC which had tried and failed years earlier.   
The BRAC process began in 1988 when Congress passed the Base Closure and 
Realignment Act to achieve significant savings by closing and realigning underutilized or 
redundant facilities.  The BRAC Act superseded a previous law, 10 U.S.C. 2687, which 
mandated congressional approval for the closure of any installation that affected more 
than 300 DoD civilian employees (Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Closure and 
Realignment, 1988).  The Act created a BRAC Commission to provide recommendations 
to the Secretary of Defense detailing which bases should be closed or realigned.  For any 
bases to be closed through this process, the Secretary of Defense was required to approve 
all of the recommendations of the Commission.  Additionally, the Act gives Congress the 
opportunity to disapprove any of the Commission’s recommendations.  If the Secretary of 
Defense approves the recommendations and Congress does not disapprove them, they 
will be implemented.  No option is given in the Act for either the Secretary of Defense or 
Congress to accept the Commission’s recommendations in part; they can only accept or 
reject the recommendations in their entirety (Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base 
Closure and Realignment, 1988). 
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 The BRAC Commission, comprised of 12 members appointed by the Secretary 
of Defense, reviewed all military installations including those under construction and 
planned for future construction.  The Commission’s role was to ensure that the process 
was objective and open, including ensuring that all of its non-classified meetings were 
open to the public (GAO, 1997).  To further ensure an objective process, no more than 
half of the Commission’s professional staff members could have worked for the DoD 
during the same year that they were a part of the BRAC Commission.  Although their 
charter required them to consider readiness requirements, manning impacts, 
environmental impacts, economic impacts, and cost savings in the first six years 
following the theoretical closure of identified bases (GAO, 1997), the 1988 Commission 
was responsible for defining the full criteria used to determine which bases should be 
realigned or closed (Defense Secretary’s Commission on Base Closure and Realignment, 
1988).  In subsequent rounds of the BRAC process, the criteria were determined by the 
Secretary of Defense (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act, 2006). 
The BRAC Commission used a two-phase process to determine which bases 
should be closed or realigned.  First, it grouped the bases by functional categories and 
reviewed the military value of these functions, the base-to-base mobility of the different 
functions, and the excess capacity in each function.  The Commission relied on the 
Services to provide the aforementioned functional data and chose several bases to review 
more closely than the broader list of bases.  These bases identified for closer reviews 
were the focus of the second phase of the process, which concentrated primarily on the 
costs and savings associated with closing and realignment.  At this stage, the Commission 
also considered the economic impact on the civilian community, the impact on the 
environment, and the impact of cleanup cost.  The environmental cost was only a minor 
consideration because the Commission determined that the DoD would be liable for those 
costs regardless of whether or not the base in question was closed.  The Commission used 
as much quantifiable data as possible but admitted that it was impossible to avoid 
subjective judgment (GAO, 1997).  The 1988 BRAC process resulted in a 
recommendation to close 86 bases, partially close 5 bases, and realign 54 bases (Defense 
Secretary’s Commission on Base Closure and Realignment, 1988).   
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Another BRAC process began when Congress passed the Defense Base Closure 
and Realignment Act of 1990.  The process was very similar to the one used in 1988 but 
with some notable changes.  An important change was that the Secretary of Defense now 
determined the decision criteria for BRAC instead of the Commission—which Congress 
had the opportunity to disapprove–and submitted recommendations for BRAC to 
Congress.  The BRAC Commission’s role was now to analyze and review the process 
that the DoD used to apply the criteria and to create recommendations on changing the 
criteria used by the Secretary of Defense.  The Commission was to submit a report to the 
President, who could then accept all, reject all, or reject some of the Commission’s 
recommendations.  If some or all were rejected, the Commission could then revise its 
report and resubmit.  If the President accepted the recommendations, Congress would 
then have the option to disapprove the recommendations.  If Congress did not disapprove, 
the recommendations would then be implemented by the Secretary of Defense (Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Act, 2006). 
The remaining BRAC decisions were also based on the Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Act—although it was amended—and used the same basic process.  The 
1991 DoD BRAC recommendation was to close 43 installations and to realign 28 other 
installations (Department of Defense [DoD], 1991). The 1991 BRAC Commission’s final 
recommendation advised 34 installation closures and 48 installation realignments 
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 1991).   
The 1993 round resulted in the DoD advocating that 31 major installations be 
closed and 12 major installations be realigned–closures or realignments that affected 
more than 300 jobs were considered major.  Additionally, 122 minor activities were 
recommended for realignment (DoD, 1993).  The 1993 BRAC Commission 
recommendation included 130 closures and 45 realignments.  Of these, 35 were major 
closures and 27 were major realignments (Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission, 1993).   
In 1995, the DoD urged 33 major closures, 26 major realignments, and 87 minor 
actions (DoD, 1995). The BRAC Commission favored 28 major closures, 22 major 
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realignments, and 83 minor actions.  Of the 133 recommendations made by the BRAC 
Commission, 10 of them were not originally recommended by DoD. 
During the most recent BRAC round in 2005, the DoD recommended closing 33 
major installations, realigning 29 major installations, and 135 minor actions.  The BRAC 
Commission recommended 22 major closures, 33 major realignments, and 127 minor 
actions (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). The recommended 
realignments included the creation of 12 locations where bases from multiple services 
would consolidate their base support functions to form joint bases, including JBLM and 
JBSA (Air Education and Training Command, 2008). 
In 2002, the DoD estimate of the total savings due to the BRAC process through 
that point in time was $16.7 billion (adjusted for inflation), but the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) characterized all estimates of BRAC savings as inexact 
estimates due to the dynamic nature of the implementation of the BRAC process (GAO, 
2002).  The DoD also estimated in 2002 that it would save $6.6 billion annually because 
of the closures resulting from the BRAC process.  The estimated savings for the 2005 
BRAC round were $15 billion if the projected personnel cost avoidance savings were not 
included, or $35.6 billion if they were included.  The 2005 BRAC round had additional 
goals other than cost savings, including improvement of military capabilities, military 
value, and transformation.  The transformation goal included improving “jointness” by 
promoting inter-service integration and operations (Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission, 2005). 
The 2005 BRAC recommendations included 12 joint-basing initiatives in which 
base support functions were consolidated under a single service for installations in close 
geographic proximity.  The combined estimated savings for the 12 joint basing initiatives 
was $183.8 million per year.  Unfortunately, a breakdown of savings for each base did 
not exist.  Due to enormous differences between the joint bases in terms of size, mission, 
personnel, etc., it is impossible to assume that any one base contributed a specific 
percentage of the total savings.  The expected savings were anticipated to be gained 
through economies of scale and a reduction in redundancy.  The projected lump-sum cost 
of establishing the 12 joint bases was $50.6 million which included the cost of change 
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management advisors, relocation costs, hiring costs, and severance costs.  Similar to 
savings of joint basing, a breakdown of costs for each base did not exist; thus, the 
differences between bases make any assumption concerning a specific percentage of total 
costs for any one base impossible.  The Air Force was selected as the lead agency for six 
joint basing initiatives, the Navy as the lead agency for four joint basing initiatives, and 
the Army as the lead agency for the remaining two joint basing initiatives.  JBLM was 
one of the joint basing initiatives that the Army was selected to lead while the Air Force 
was selected as the lead agency for JBSA (Air Education and Training Command, 2008).  
If the total cost of establishing the joint bases equals the estimated $50.6 million, then 
savings required must equal or surpass this amount in order for joint basing to be 
considered a fiscal success.   
JBLM reached its full operating capability (FOC) on 1 October, 2010 (Bartell, 
2010).  It was created by consolidating McChord Air Force Base and the adjacent Fort 
Lewis, a U.S. Army base.  McChord Air Force Base was an airlift base that fell under Air 
Mobility Command (AMC).  Fort Lewis was the headquarters of I Corps, home to 
multiple ground combat units, and fell under United States Army Forces. 
The 2005 BRAC Commission also recommended the creation of Joint Base San 
Antonio.  The Commission’s report recommended that the installation management 
functions of Fort Sam Houston and Randolph Air Force Base be relocated to Lackland 
Air Force Base.  Fort Sam Houston was the headquarters of Army Medical Command 
(MEDCOM) and received multiple new medical units including the Army Medical 
Research Detachment and dental research units from the Army, Air Force, and Navy as a 
result of the same BRAC Commission that created the joint-basing initiative.  
Additionally, it received new responsibilities not associated with new units such as 
Combat Casualty Care Research, the inpatient function of Wilford Hall Medical Center, 
and enlisted medical training (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 
2005).  Fort Sam Houston also houses the 502d Air Base Wing, which provides 
installation support for each of the three separate entities that make up Joint Base San 
Antonio.  Randolph Air Force Base was the headquarters of Air Education and Training 
Command (AETC) as well as the location of the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC).  
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Lackland Air Force Base was the home of Air Force enlisted Basic Military Training 
(BMT) and also fell under AETC.  Joint Base San Antonio also reached FOC October 1, 
2010 (Elliot, 2010). 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND GAP IN LITERATURE 
No extensively researched literature currently exists showing how to consolidate 
contracting activities in the federal government so that the desired results of cost savings, 
improvement of military capabilities, military value, and jointness can be achieved.  No 
set of rules or procedures currently dictates how to go about putting processes, 
governance structures, organizations, and communication into place to achieve these 
required savings.  Thus, the requisite enablers are largely unknown.  Likewise, the 
barriers to consolidation are not known.  Absent the identification of enablers and 
barriers, consolidated contracting activities in the federal government fail to create an 
environment in which the desired results can be achieved.  Furthermore, correct 
application enables enormous savings in time and resources while simultaneously 
reducing negative mission impacts. 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Utilizing a case study approach, we sought in this research to identify specific 
factors that contribute to the organizational successes of joint base contracting.  These 
factors include processes, governance structures, organizational structures, and 
communication.  We also identify barriers to consolidation.  In order to more clearly 
understand the consolidation of the contracting functions at these two installations, we 
compare and contrast the way JBSA and JBLM operate.  Using previously identified 
successful organizational consolidations throughout the literature review, we aim in this 
research to find areas of potential improvement for JBSA and JBLM.  By documenting 




of future joint base contracting throughout the Air Force, DoD, and any other government 
organizations.  The specific research questions addressed in this research are as follows: 
1)  What are the barriers to effective consolidation? 
2)  What are the enablers to effective consolidation? 
3)  What processes governance structures, organizational structures, and 
communication lines and mediums are currently being employed? 
4)  What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current approach(es) to 
consolidation by the by the United States Air Force and the United States 
Army? 
5)  Will the employed processes, governance structures, organizational 
structures, and communication lines be successful? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Yin (2009) recommended the case study method when looking at processes that 
answer “how” or “why” a particular event occurred, and this method is ideal for focusing 
on ongoing events as contrasted to controlled experiments.  The case study methodology 
is appropriate for this research because the purpose is to see how contracting functions at 
separate bases consolidated into joint base units and why the particular processes were 
used.  Because the joint bases are already formed, this research was purely aimed at 
reviewing the processes rather than at manipulating factors and measuring resultant 
outcomes. 
F. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
This study has several managerial implications.  Most notably, there are currently 
12 joint bases across the DoD, and each of these joint bases has at least one contracting 
organization.  These contracting organizations began the joint basing process, but 
consolidation is far from complete.  By providing this information to the current 
contracting squadron commanders or directors, a valuable insight can be added to their 
available resources.  Additionally, while no plans currently exist to create more joint 
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bases, the current financial climate in the United States and resulting budgetary pressure 
in Congress and the Pentagon indicate that more cuts to federal spending will be sought 
throughout all parts of the federal government.  Based on the outcome of the current joint 
bases—specifically on the ability to contract more efficiently—more joint bases could be 
forthcoming, in which case this study should act as a guide for implementation of the 
contracting units.   
The information provided by answering the research questions should allow 
contracting activities at any joint location to plan more effectively for and react to 
contract consolidation activities.  By providing these answers to the contracting body of 
knowledge, we hope to improve the performance of these and future contract 
consolidation efforts.  Identifying enablers and barriers to effective consolidation will 
provide any future consolidated contracting activities a pathway towards success.  
Informing the United States Air Force and United States Army of the strengths and 
weaknesses in their current approach to consolidated contracting will allow for potential 
improvement to both Services.  Examining the current processes, governance structures, 
organizational structures, and communication lines being employed aids the United 
States Air Force and United States Army.  Additionally, the Services can determine 
whether they are contributing to meeting the overall goals of BRAC: cost savings, 
transformation, improvement of capabilities, and enhancement of military value (Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Although no specific literature exists that directly addresses the topic of this study 
in its entirety, literature relating to individual aspects of the BRAC process exists in 
volumes.  Specifically, we apply the literature concerning the contingency theory of 
organizational design, mergers and acquisitions, change management, and strategic 
sourcing to guide this study. 
B. CONCEPTS 
1. Contingency Theory of Organizational Design 
The contingency theory of organizational design is a way of viewing 
organizations through a theoretical lens, which contends that organizational effectiveness 
is achieved by aligning organizational design with each situation (Donaldson, 2001).  
Performance or effectiveness is then a function of how well the organization “fits” into 
the environment in which it resides (Donaldson, 2001).  Rather than identifying a best 
practice laundry list or creating an ineffectual pictorial chart to describe the theory, its 
uses are far-reaching and can be understood and applied by the layperson (Shepard & 
Hougland, 1978).  Fit refers to the appropriate relationship between an internal and 
external aspect of an organization (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1986).  For example, the 
organizational structure of a company may change based on the industry in which it 
competes.   
The contingency theory of organizational design differs from all other theories of 
organization in that rather than adopting factors to promote a maximum outcome or 
performance, factors are aligned to the appropriate level to fit the contingency 
(Donaldson, 2001).  To accept this theory, one must accept that optimal levels of 
performance may be achieved without reaching the elusive, aforementioned “maximum.”  
For example, a football coach may recognize on third down and long that a pass play 
would generally be considered most appropriate; however, due to weather, personnel, or 
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other factors, he or she may opt for a run play that would generally be considered 
incorrect in terms of book-knowledge of the game.  In the coach’s view, however, it may 
be the most appropriate play for the situation.   
The contingency theory of organizational design has its roots in 1961 when Tom 
Burns and G.M. Stalker published their book, The Management of Innovation.  They 
identified that organizations seek to fit with the contingencies with which they are 
presented.  The focus of Burns and Stalker (1961) was that the organizational 
environment in which organizations operate plays a major role in the contingency of 
designing the correct fit.  This work was further developed over the next 50 years, and 
research supporting their initial idea of structuring organizations appropriately for their 
contingencies abounds.  Subsequent research studies furthered the idea of fitting 
organizations into their appropriate contingency environment (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1986; 
Pennings, 1992; Woodward, 1965).  Other researchers quickly recognized that 
organizations required environmental considerations in order to be successful.  The 
contingency theory of organizational design can and should be applied across diverse 
organizations and industries with different managerial structures and configurations 
(Burton, DeSanctis, & Obel, 2006).  Organization leaders who ignore this important idea 
of fitting their organizations with the contingency environment see degraded performance 
in multiple business areas (Donaldson, 2001).   
Significant follow-on work has taken the idea of contingency theory to other 
fields of study.  For example, Fred Fiedler’s (1967) creation of the contingency theory of 
leadership took the base work of Burns and Stalker (1961) and transitioned it from 
organizational design into the realm of leadership.  James W. Fredrickson (1984) applied 
the contingency theory to the decision-making process to address how to comprehend and 
use imperfect information.  More recently, John E. Delery and D. Harold Doty (1996) 
even took the ideas behind the contingency theory of organizational design and applied 
them to the realm of human resources, creating a solid theoretical foundation for a field 
they claimed was previously absent.   
With the opportunity for improved performance and the threat of decreasing 
performance now identified in literature, studies into the link between organizational 
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structure and performance began to increase in frequency.  Each application of the 
contingency theory of organizational design provided unique information to the field of 
study, and whether quantitative or qualitative, each showed the importance of 
organizational fit (Donaldson, 1987; Holdaway, Newberry, Hickson, & Heron, 1975; 
Woodward 1965).  Additionally, these findings held true for both public and private 
sector organizations because organizational fit was imperative for both types of 
organizations.  Even when compared simultaneously, the importance of fit showed 
quantitative support of roughly equal importance to either public or private entities 
(Holdaway et al., 1975). 
Three foundational commonalities exist between the contingency theories in each 
field of managerial study.  These three commonalities lay at the heart of the contingency 
theory: the association between contingency and organizational structure, the change 
process that contingency change causes organizational structural change, and the fit of 
structure to contingency that affects performance (Donaldson, 2001).  By understanding 
these three commonalities and the literature that supports them, best practices can be 
discovered at JBSA and JBLM.  In addition to identifying best practices, analysis of the 
literature within each of these commonalities also allows us to identify weaknesses that 
can be applied to the case.   
There is a correlation between contingency and structure.  The presentation of this 
correlation may be quantitative (Holdaway et al., 1975) or qualitative (Woodward, 1965).  
The strength of this correlation relies directly on the different magnitudes of the 
contingencies.  In 1973, Child identified what role organizational size plays and how 
bureaucracies can have a direct impact on organizational structure.  He identified that 
although size is a significant portion, other factors must be considered because 
complexity expands as size increases.  Specifically, Child (1973) qualitatively and 
quantitatively showed that formalization and decentralization are the main factors in 
successful organizational structure.  Although Child’s 1973 study specifically used 
commercial organizations, its applicability is directly pertinent to public organizations as 
well.   
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The idea that contingency change causes organizational structural change is 
important to analyze.  Some argue that structural contingency is static (Galunic & 
Eisenhardt, 1994), but this is an incorrect assessment.  The contingency theory of 
organizational design is fluid and dynamic because both organizations and environments 
change over time (Donaldson, 2001).  In fact, as the contingency structure changes, the 
organizations must adapt in order to remain effective (Burns & Stalker, 1961).  Those 
organizations that fail to adapt will subsequently observe decreased performance as 
changes to either the structure or the environment make them obsolete.   
Because fit affects performance, organizations must carefully consider their 
environment and structure (Donaldson, 2001).  Much like trying on new shoes or clothing 
to find the best size, organizations also seek to find the perfect fit.  However, the 
complexity required by organizations searching for the perfect fit differs immensely from 
individuals trying on shoes.  Understanding adaptability is one success predictor, and the 
knowledge of when to adapt is another.  Creating a new fit to improve performance and 
meet the changed contingency first requires an effective feedback loop to identify the 
change (Donaldson, 2001).  This feedback loop is essential to the continued evolution of 
organizations as they morph internally and externally with their environment.  Lowered 
performance, forecast changes, or personnel changes are all ways in which the feedback 
can be identified and even predicted with limited accuracy (Donaldson, 1987, 2001). 
In addition to the three foundational commonalities described here, we identify an 
important fourth commonality.  Task uncertainty is a contingency that interfaces with 
technological advancements, business environment changes, and industry innovation—
creating enormous pitfalls for organizations (Gresov, 1990).  With special consideration 
given to governance structures, task uncertainty can create free-floating units within an 
organization unsure of its true role or purpose.  Therefore, very specific attention and 
immediate “refit” action must be taken when task uncertainty roles emerge because their 
spill-over effects can be far reaching (Donaldson, 2001). 
Other researchers have identified myriad additional organizational contingencies 
that play a role in the ultimate performance of units.  However, for the purpose of this 
case study research, we have limited the contingency theory predictors for success to the 
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previously identified factors: formalization, decentralization, adaptability, effective 
feedback, and task uncertainty.  When formal policies or procedures are in place and 
decentralized decision-making is encouraged, the literature shows an increased 
probability of success.  Similarly, when organizations prove to be adaptable with 
changing contingencies, the chances of success improve.  The same applies to 
implementing effective feedback processes and minimizing task uncertainty.  Throughout 
this research, we highlight and emphasize these, especially with regard to governance 
structures. 
2. Mergers and Acquisitions 
Although the BRAC decision to create JBSA and JBLM was congressionally 
directed, much of the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) literature applies.  In both JBSA 
and JBLM, no base or service truly acquired the other; however, both bases saw a merger 
of functions and a subsequent appointment of a lead contracting service.  In the corporate 
world, the majority of mergers fail in every sense (Weber & Camerer, 2003).  Conflict 
arises, turnover occurs, and participants at every level seem disappointed with the results 
(Buono, Bowditch, & Lewis, 1985).  Although the option to divest a non-performing unit 
is unavailable to JBSA or JBLM, the goal of creating value still exists.  By examining 
M&A literature and identifying processes that are indicators of success, guidance can be 
given to improve the consolidation of contracting units.   
Fifty years of intense M&A research has had no appreciable impact on the failure 
rate of mergers (Cartwright, 2005).  According to one author, “traditional M&A research 
has failed to find answers to improve the continuing high failure rates of M&As.  The 
most frequently studied variables have offered no consistent explanations why some 
firms ... succeed at implementing M&As changes and others fail” (Clayton, 2010, p. 1).  
Despite the continued struggle for M&As, the research has identified several key factors 
as best practices and indicators for success.  While accepting that more research is 
needed, consistent information does appear throughout the literature that acts as either an 
indicator for success or failure.   
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The adaptability of both organizations and individuals is closely tied to the idea of 
culture.  Organizational culture is a shared social understanding brought about by 
commonly held assumptions and world-views among members of an organization 
(Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983).  An organizational culture is the traditions, shared beliefs, and 
expectations about how individuals should behave and how tasks should be accomplished 
in organizations (Cartwright & Cooper, 1993).  Because culture is so pervasive in both 
organizations and individuals, failure to understand and address it appropriately 
significantly increases the failure rate of M&As (Weber & Camerer, 2003).  
Understanding cultural differences between organizations is important and also has 
several subcomponents that must be understood and adequately addressed. 
A study of 156 companies in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific that was 
conducted over six months concluded that the most detrimental barrier to successful 
partnerships is differences in organizational culture (Johnson, 2004).  Working with 
another organization through M&As is more than just gaining new coworkers.  Instead, it 
is coexisting and often clashing with every facet of the other organization currently or in 
the future (Badrtalei & Bates, 2007).  Because an organization’s culture is a result of the 
organization’s history, it will resist change despite the environmental changes happening 
within an organization, specifically in M&As (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohav, & Sanders, 
1990). 
Acculturation is the outcome of a process in which the attitudes, beliefs, and 
values of two previously independent organizations form a unified culture (Larsson & 
Lubatkin, 2001).  Obviously, firms involved in M&As must transition through 
acculturation in the development of the unified organization.  Employees may resist 
acculturation by remaining individualistic or by forming subcultures in the post-M&A 
environment, but reducing or minimizing the occurrences is critical for successful task 
completion (Creasy, Stull, & Peck, 2009).  This culture clash is a situation that has severe 
consequences, including low employee buy-in to the transformation, high turnover, low 




al., 1985; Sales & Mirvis, 1984).  Although research does exist on various aspects of 
cultural discontinuity, the literature is not extensive enough to provide sufficient causal 
links (Creasy et al., 2009). 
The cultural discontinuity surfaces as the premerger entities transition to their 
postmerger reality (Creasy et al., 2009).  The differences in managerial practices are 
especially significant for the organizations as the shift to unite the separate entities takes 
place (Marks & Marvis, 1985).  When leadership styles in an organization are vastly 
altered or unceremoniously changed due to an M&A, the culture of one or both 
organizations will likely experience some form of culture shock.  This culture shock is 
most apparent when control systems, administrative practices, or management styles 
between the pre-merger and post-merger entities differ significantly (Creasy et al., 2009).  
Unless directly addressed, organizational instability will increase and a number of 
questions about structural-, cultural-, and responsibility-related changes and concerns 
potentially leading to significantly degraded organizational performance will grow 
(Buono & Bodwitch, 1989).   
In connection to the cultural problems, another frequently identified success-
indicating factor is a company’s ability to adapt or evolve to meet the new requirements 
placed on them by management (Clayton, 2010; Swaminathan, Murshed, & Hulland, 
2008).  Just as with the contingency theory of organizational design, the theme of fitting 
organizations to the environment continues throughout M&A literature.  The concept of 
adaptability is broken down into four subcomponents:  change, openness, shared vision, 
and positive emotional attractor (Clayton, 2010).  Each of these subcomponents of post 
M&A flexibility is important to understand, but may be applied overall as adaptability.   
As individual bases are merged to create joint bases, the problems, angst, and 
demands experienced by the bases are similar to the commercial world.  Adaptability to 
change is the first identified factor that is a key indicator of the future success of an M&A 
(Clayton, 2010).  Organizations that have adaptive qualities are better able to focus on a 
common goal without sacrificing performance (Losada & Heaphy, 2004).  The personnel 
must be listened to and the integration of first-level employees must occur during the  
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transition process.  This is because personnel at the edge of transitional chaos are most 
likely to create and subsequently implement effective ideas that will garner the highest 
level of buy-in (Losada & Heaphy, 2004).   
Inseparable from adaptability is the fact that organizations must have openness.  
In The Fifth Discipline, Peter Senge (1990) explained two aspects of the concept of 
openness that organizations seek to achieve.  The first is participative openness, which is 
the freedom of individuals to speak out and be heard.  The second is reflective openness, 
which is the willingness to change based on the input of others.  Both participative and 
reflective openness are essential in order to achieve a successful fit of organizations with 
their environment (Senge, 1990).  Management’s attempt to require organizations or units 
to have both participative and reflective openness is made even more difficult when 
combining organizations through M&As. 
If openness is coupled with a shared vision by both organizations employees, the 
predictors of success grow.  Especially for units in a post-M&A environment, this shared 
vision is absolutely essential for the future success of the organization (Clayton, 2010).  
A shared vision is more than an important driver of and predictor for successful change.  
For individuals and groups in the midst of transition (turbulent or smooth), shared vision 
is the first discovery made that provides the foundation for all future transitions and 
integrations to be successful (Akrivou, Boyatzis, & McLeod, 2006).  This shared vision 
then provides a pathway that both individuals and the organization as a whole can follow 
toward increasing the probability of a successful merger or acquisition.   
Finally, M&As require a positive emotional attractor that helps shape and grow 
the optimism, strengths, and hopes of individuals or groups toward their aspired ultimate 
position (Howard, 2006).  Individuals with a positive emotional feeling toward the 
ultimate goal are more able to learn and change, thus providing more value to the 
organization as a whole (Howard, 2006).  Individuals who lack this positive emotional 
attractor may have a difficult time obtaining employee buy-in, which can lead to other 
problems associated with the integration of two separate units into one (Losada & 
Heaphy, 2004).   
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There are some important lessons that have been learned through failures in 
integration following M&As as well.  One lesson that Badrtalei and Bates (2007) 
identified in their examination of the Daimler-Chrysler merger was that change is 
inevitable and that it must be accepted and embraced if the organization has any hope of 
moving forward.  Claims by management that no changes will occur after the merger are 
disingenuous and cause employees to lose faith in the competence of their leaders.  
Management honesty and competence as viewed by an organization’s employees is 
identified as a key factor in the predictability of success (Creasy et al., 2009; 
Swaminathan et al., 2008).  Another lesson identified by Badrtalei and Bates (2007) is 
that timing is key for any M&A process.  Their rule of thumb is to double or triple the 
expected timeframe needed to accomplish integration. 
The time it takes to implement M&As is another factor that has been studied at 
length.  However, timing also falls short of being a complete predictor on how 
performance will be affected.  Homburg and Bucerius (2006) proposed that managers 
involved with M&As consciously determine an appropriate pace for the integration to 
occur.  They proposed that the rate should be aligned so that when external relatedness is 
low and internal relatedness high, speed is beneficial.  Conversely, when external 
relatedness is high and internal relatedness is low, speed acts detrimentally.  However, 
other authors have stated that while the speed is important, it is only important as it 
relates to fitting the new organization into the new environment (Bragado, 1992).   
Finally, it is imperative that the overall goal of the merger or acquisition be 
understood by all stakeholders prior to its implementation (Swaminathan et al., 2008).  If 
consolidation is the aim of joint bases (U.S. Army Base Realignment and Closure 
Division, 2006), then the focus of effort should be on gaining operational efficiencies 
(Swaminathan et al., 2008).  However, if the perceived organizational support for 
previously separate units seems lacking, the degradation of performance is sure to follow 
(Creasy et al., 2009). 
A significant number of additional M&A theories exist along with additional 
M&A literature.  However, for the purpose of this case study research, predictors for 
success will be limited to the previously identified factors: minimizing culture shock, 
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adaptability, openness, shared vision, positive emotional attractors, and the understanding 
of the goal by all stakeholders.  By minimizing culture shock, the process of integration 
can begin earlier and with better results.  Having employees, especially leaders, who are 
adaptable and open to change can take new organizations forward in ways otherwise 
impossible.  Also, gaining that shared vision with positive emotional attractors further 
decreases the probability of failure. Finally, ensuring that every stakeholder understands 
their role through effective communication produces the end product sought after by all, 
but achieved by few. 
3. Change Management 
Another important concept required to answer the research questions is the 
concept of change management.  John Kotter is considered by many to have laid the 
foundation of the change management field when he published Leading Change in 1996.  
In that book, Kotter revealed that only 30% of change initiatives succeed.  Twelve years 
and thousands of scholarly articles later, a McKinsey survey of 3,199 executives from 
around the world found that only one in three transformation initiatives succeed (Aiken & 
Keller, 2009).  Kotter (1996) studied both successful and unsuccessful attempts at change 
and identified the lessons learned or predictors for each.  Although most literature on 
change management looks at the private sector lessons learned, some of the concepts can 
be applied directly to the public sector’s contracting organizations.  Kotter (1996) 
identified eight predictors for success and eight critical mistakes to avoid when an 
organization is undergoing change.  Underlying Kotter’s work is the basis that the 
companies are making changes to improve themselves.  Whereas for-profit companies 
introduce changes as they are needed to increase profitability (Schaffer & Thomson, 
1992), government agencies often implement changes as directed by either elected or 
appointed officials.  Although all 16 of Kotter’s (1996) ideas are valuable, especially in 
the private industry, not all are necessary when examining government contracting 
entities.  The most applicable ideas include a communicated vision, empowered 
employees, and a positive culture change.  
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The importance of a communicated vision remains vital to the successful change 
of any organization.  The success of change programs relies less on the persuasiveness of 
the individuals leading the change than it does on their understanding of the message 
(Aiken & Keller, 2009).  A study of those responsible to implement change found that a 
failure to successfully communicate the vision of change was the most frequently 
identified category of encountered problems (Lewis, 2000).  The failure to adequately 
communicate the vision by leadership creates uncertainty and ambiguity concerning the 
true goals of the change.  This lack of understanding the goals or vision often leads to the 
failure of change initiatives (Lewis, 2000).  It is critical to communicate before and 
during change because “failure to share information or to inform people adequately of 
what changes are necessary and why they are necessary” has undesired results (Covin & 
Kilmann, 1990, p. 239).  
If the entire organization understands and supports a change effort but the barriers 
preventing them from changing are not removed, the effort may still fail.  “In highly 
successful change efforts, when people begin to understand and act on a change vision, it 
is important to remove barriers in their paths” (Kotter & Cohen, 2002, p. 73).  Failure to 
remove these barriers is often not deliberate, but because the formal steps required to 
remove barriers have not occurred, employees become powerless to support the change 
effort (Aiken & Keller, 2009).  New ideas, best practices, or information sharing are just 
a few of the possibilities that show the empowerment of the employees.  However, in 
most companies, resistance to empowering employees is system-wide (Bernoff & 
Schadler, 2010).  The DoD surely falls into such a category with its strict regulations and 
rank structure, but it must recognize that failure to empower the employees may 
significantly hinder, or even thwart, attempts at successful change. 
A culture change is vital to any successful change management initiative.  As 
previously identified, the role of culture is key to the outcome of organizations (Buono & 
Bodwitch, 1989; Buono et al., 1985; Creasy et al., 2009; Hofstede et al., 1990; Sales & 
Mirvis, 1984; Weber & Camerer, 2003; Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983).  Because culture lies at 
the true soul of any organization, taking an organization through a change in which the 
culture will be altered (even minimally) will have enormous impacts immediately and in 
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the future.  Those impacts can have enormous repercussions, and some authors even 
argue that a culture which embraces adaptability creates an enormous competitive 
advantage (Reeves & Deimler, 2011).  When change is happening, culture will be 
impacted.  However, by ensuring that it is a positive change and by minimizing the 
culture shock, the change has a greatly improved chance of being successful.   
Change management theories and ideas have been building upon one another for 
years as the available information and the changes occurring grow.  For the purpose of 
this case study, predictors for success will be limited to a communicated vision, 
empowered employees, and a positive culture change.  Both vision and culture are also 
identified in M&A literature, and the empowerment of employees ties directly to the 
decentralization identified in the contingency theory of organizational design literature.  
The importance of these predictors of success is significant because they permeate three 
distinct fields of study. 
4. Strategic Sourcing 
The main idea of strategic sourcing is that proactive procurement strategies can be 
implemented that make organizations more efficient than organizations that utilize 
reactive, tactical procurement.  In a May, 2005 memo, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) defined strategic sourcing as “the collaborative and structured process of 
critically analyzing an organization’s spending and using this information to make 
business decisions about acquiring commodities and services more effectively and 
efficiently” (p. 1).  However, strategic sourcing does not have a standard definition and 
its use in academic literature varies widely; it is commonly described as a process that 
ensures all purchasing activities align with the strategic goals of the organization 
(Zsidisin & Ellram, 2001).   
At the most basic level, strategic sourcing focuses on aligning purchasing 
processes and policies with the corporate strategy. This allows purchasing to be utilized 
strategically and adds significant value and competitive advantage to the organization 
that far exceeds an administrative function (Rendon, 2005).  To be truly strategic, 
purchasing must also have some influence in the corporate strategy because this allows 
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the company to take advantage of the market knowledge of the purchasing unit (Burt, 
Dobler, & Starling, 2003).  Strategic sourcing not only involves the internal purchasing 
function but also includes relationships with suppliers as an integral part of the process.  
The successful management of these relationships can allow an organization to improve 
all aspects of its performance, including cost, quality, and responsiveness (Monczka, 
Trent, & Handfield, 2005). 
Kraljic (1983) suggests that a radical change in philosophy is required to change 
purchasing from a clerical function to strategic function.  He states that after this 
transformation takes place, the organization will be better suited to deal with the 
uncertainties and risks of doing business in a truly global economy.  The cross-functional 
nature of this change goes beyond purchasing; in order to be effective, purchasing must 
broaden its scope to supply management.  Zsidisin and Ellram (2001) bring many of 
these ideas together by proposing that establishing and maintaining alliances with 
suppliers is a strategic function for purchasing and supply management (PSM) activities.  
Not only does it force the purchasing function to align with broader organizational 
objectives, but it also forces the strategies of the suppliers to be integrated with those of 
the purchasing organization. 
Ellram and Carr (1994) found three distinct areas that the academic literature on 
strategic sourcing only generally covered.  The first area was literature related to the 
choices the purchasing function had to address.  Stemming from the choices were the 
application of strategies for these decisions and how these decisions impacted other areas 
of the organization.  They wrote that strategic sourcing decisions are influenced by the 
current market situation for suppliers and the type of purchase that is being considered 
(Ellram & Carr, 1994).  They also discussed the implications of purchasing decisions for 
marketing and the requirement for strategic cooperation between marketing and 
purchasing (Jain & Laric, 1979; Williams, Giunipero & Henthorne, 1994).  Hahn, Kim, 
and Kim (1986) covered strategies for increasing competition including awarding 
multiple contracts, relying on short-term contracts, and competitive bidding.  It is 
interesting to note that they found that the uncertainty of these methods can cause 
increased costs for the suppliers and does not necessarily pay off in the long-term.  
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Rossetti and Choi (2005) also warned of the possible consequences of competition 
between the purchasing organization and its strategic partners.   
The second noted area of focus for strategic sourcing literature by Ellram and 
Carr (1994) was on the process of integrating purchasing into corporate strategy and the 
role of purchasing in supporting corporate strategy.  Spekman (1981) argued that before 
purchasing is viewed as a long-term strategic asset, strategic planning must be used 
effectively by the purchasing function.  This example could be made by developing 
strategic relationships with suppliers that could later be integrated into corporate strategy 
as purchasing is recognized as a strategic function.  Purchasing can directly impact 
corporate strategy by providing options and insight into the supply market (Browning, 
Zabriskie & Huellmantel, 1983) and the appropriate management of supplier 
relationships (Landeros & Monczka, 1989). Ellram and Carr (1994) also discussed the 
importance and potential advantage of having purchasing activities support long-term 
corporate objectives.  The awareness of the long-term plans should lead to efficient 
resource allocation and short-term improvements as well as to support for the long-term 
goals (Chen, Paulraj & Lado, 2004) as long as the awareness of the plans leads to daily 
operations that support them (St. John & Young, 1991). 
The third focus of strategic sourcing literature is the utilization of purchasing as a 
strategic asset for the organization (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  One study found that while 
many managers are aware of the potential of better utilizing the purchasing function, high 
ranking individuals in purchasing spent too much time on daily operations and not 
enough time dealing with strategic issues so that they did not contribute to success on the 
strategic level (Spekman & Hill, 1980).  Another obstacle to the potential contribution of 
strategic sourcing is that even when purchasing managers believe they have input into 
corporate strategy, it may be disregarded (Farmer, 1981).  Van Weele (1984) found that 
the perception of purchasing by corporate managers varied widely from being a purely 
administrative function to being a high-level strategic function.  Similarly, the integration 




to company.  However, the strategic use of purchasing is trending upwards and appears to 
enhance the competitiveness of firms that do successfully integrate purchasing 
(Narasimhan & Das, 2001). 
Chen et al. (2004) also presents a model that links strategic sourcing to the 
financial performance of the organization.  Choosing to develop relationships with 
specific, critical suppliers limits the supply base for certain components but allows the 
firm to work very closely with the chosen suppliers, which actually increases the 
effectiveness of the supply base (Cousins, 1999).  Additionally, adopting a long-term 
orientation in dealing with suppliers reduces conflict, encourages cooperation, and 
improves decision making with imperfect information (Morgan & Hunt, 1994).  Because 
of these impacts, both reducing the supplier base and the adoption of a long-term 
orientation improve the firm’s ability to react to the needs of customers, which 
encourages repeat business and ultimately improves the financial performance of the firm 
(Chen et al., 2004). 
Other approaches to determining a successful sourcing strategy exist.  Kraljic’s 
(1983, p. 113) approach to determining the most suitable sourcing strategy using the 
Purchasing Portfolio Matrix is still the most widely used model in strategic sourcing 
(Gelderman & Van Weele, 2003).  The central idea of the model is that the appropriate 
sourcing strategy depends on two primary factors:  “(1) the strategic importance of 
purchasing in terms of the value added by product line… and (2) the complexity of the 
supply market” (Kraljic, 1983, p. 110).  The strategic importance of purchasing is 
determined based on the potential impact that savings or overruns could have on 
profitability.  For instance, if a single raw material made up almost all of the cost of a 
product, the potential gain or damage is very significant for that product and the strategic 
importance of purchasing would be high.  The complexity of the supply market is 
assessed by using factors such as scarcity, availability of substitutes, barriers to entry, the 
pace of technological change, and the degree of rivalry among suppliers (Kraljic, 1983). 
All procurements are categorized using the factors mentioned previously, and 
they receive a high or low rating for each factor.  These ratings are then used to determine 
the most appropriate sourcing strategy (see Figure 1).  The categories are strategic (both 
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purchasing importance and supply complexity are high), leverage (purchasing importance 
is high and supply complexity is low), bottleneck (purchasing importance is low and 
supply complexity is high), and noncritical (purchasing importance and supply 
complexity are low; Kraljic, 1983). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Purchasing Portfolio Matrix (From Kraljic, 1983, p. 111). 
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Procurements that are classified as strategic lend themselves to extensive market 
research and developing long-term, cooperative relationships with the suppliers.  The 
buyer–supplier relationship could also be seen as an opportunity to closely monitor the 
supplier’s performance and to promote continuous process improvements.  Bottleneck 
procurements require reliable suppliers; thus, thorough market research is essential.  
Purchase of some safety stock may be necessary to absorb some delays, but advanced 
planning may be able to preclude this issue.  Leverage procurements allow the buyer to 
exploit their position and the competitive market for favorable terms and volume 
discounts for large quantities.  Noncritical items should be handled in the most efficient 
manner possible while ensuring that the supplier is still providing a good product at a 
good price (Kraljic, 1983). 
The simplicity of Kraljic’s (1983) approach allows any purchasing organization to 
easily develop appropriate sourcing strategies for many types of goods and services.  
Ratings are not always simply high or low but they can fall anywhere on a continuum; an 
appropriate strategy can be determined from the combination of the purchasing 
importance and supply complexity.  Supply, demand, and organizational priorities change 
over time and this can impact a procurement’s location on Kraljic’s model; thus, the 
chosen approach should be periodically reviewed (Kraljic, 1983). 
Strategic sourcing offers the opportunity for greater efficiency through economies 
of scale and lower transaction costs as well as the opportunity for product improvement 
through buyer–supplier relationships and PSM.  The academic literature shows the 
importance of strategic sourcing and its potential to impact corporate strategy and firm 
performance (Chen et al., 2004), as well as several barriers that have prevented the 
successful application of strategic sourcing.  The Kraljic (1983) Purchasing Portfolio 
Matrix provides an easy way to determine appropriate sourcing strategies for numerous 
goods and services.  This information provides the theoretical background for strategic 
sourcing as well as many lessons from earlier implementation.  While the DoD’s ability 
to implement strategic sourcing is limited by other statutory policy considerations such as 
competition requirements and small business goals, the literature clearly shows that 
strategic sourcing goes far beyond the consolidation of contracts.  For example, strategic 
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sourcing also includes early supplier involvement in product design and innovation, 
supplier development, supply base optimization, supplier relationship and performance 
management, strategic cost management, and electronic procurement (including reverse 
auctions).  For joint basing, some efficiencies are expected through requirement 
consolidation, but there is also significant potential for value to be realized by ensuring 
that all available information is used to support procurement decisions that align with the 





A. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Because no literature or survey exists that perfectly fits the goals of this research, 
the use of a case study was required.  Yin (2009) explained that a case study is an 
experiential and observational investigation into a recent circumstance within the 
environment in which it naturally occurs.  Yin (2009) proposed that the primary attribute 
that makes the case study approach beneficial is the ability to consider the full variety of 
evidence.  This evidence could include interviews, observations, and documents and is 
limited only by the availability of data.  Yin (2009) recommended using the case study 
approach when investigating recent or ongoing occurrences that are beyond the control of 
the researcher, or in other words, when experimentation is impossible.  The case study 
approach is ideally suited to address questions about what, how, and why the investigated 
event occurred. 
In this case study, we used a three-pronged approach to find the changes that 
occurred to the contracting units since joint basing.  First, we conducted interviews with 
individuals associated with the contracting units, including customers, via telephone and 
e-mail and in person.  Second, archival records were gathered while on-site at JBSA and 
JBLM, including organizational structure charts, guidance letters, and communication 
plans.  Finally, we observed first-hand exchanges that occurred both internally and 
externally to the contracting units.   
The case study approach allowed us to study many areas of the contracting units 
from various perspectives.  For example, we studied contracting from the perspective of 
the for-profit sector through academic literature, the federal government through GAO 
reports, the DoD through the BRAC reports, and the people who actually implemented 
joint basing through interviews and observation.  Yin (2009) stated that the greatest asset 
of case study research is the ability it gives researchers to consider all of the evidence, 
including what may not be available in a purely archival study.  In order to thoroughly 
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scrutinize the process of joint basing contracting offices, we reviewed two separate 
units—an approach that is validated by Eisenhardt (1989). 
The first data collection method we used entailed conducting interviews at JBSA 
and JBLM.  We individually recruited the directors and commanders of the contracting 
organizations to participate in the study because they obviously play a key role in the 
unit.  Next, we asked flight commanders along with other contracting professionals, 
including warranted contracting officers, if they wanted to participate in the study.  
Finally, we sought the input of the internal customers of the contracting units on the 
process of joint basing.  We developed the interview questions to help answer our 
research questions.  The interview questions underwent scrutiny and multiple levels of 
revision by us and by our advisors.  A copy of the final interview protocol asked during 
the interviews is attached in Appendix A.  The interviews were audio recorded, 
transcribed, and verified.  A total of 35 interviews occurred at JBSA which transcribed 
into 231 pages, whereas JBLM had a total of 19 interviews transcribed into 277 pages. 
This multi-layered approach adds validity to the study and also helped us to identify 
patterns in the interviews.   
The second method of data collection occurred while on location conducting 
interviews.  After the interviews occurred, we collected written information available at 
each squadron. JBSA provided 26 documents including 5 different organizational charts, 
user guides, squadron operating instructions, customer instruction briefings, mission 
briefings, strategic sourcing information, and spend data for JBSA.  The 32 documents 
provided by JBLM included 5 organizational charts, the final memorandum of agreement 
between the bases, the operation order for the consolidation, the implementation plan for 
the contracting consolidation, a flow chart for the submission of requirements, a 
Government Purchase Card (GPC) transition plan, the cost performance visibility 
framework, and guidance and instructions from various levels. Some interview questions 
directly addressed this collection of records, but all available unit instructions were 
sought.  The first figures we sought were the organizational structure charts for the pre- 
and post-consolidation of each unit.  These are telling pictographs that acted as the basis 
for our evaluations of governance structures.  Next, we requested guidance letters or unit-
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level direction to give a clearer understanding of how the processes had changed since the 
consolidation had occurred.  Finally, we sought communication plans so that we could 
examine any differences in how information exchanges occurred, however, neither base 
had a written communication plan.  
The final method we used for collecting information was observation.  We 
conducted first-hand observations of the subjects we interviewed and of the contracting 
unit’s daily.  These observations included body language during interviews as well as 
contracting unit employees’ actions throughout the day.  No conclusions were reached 
based upon these observations. 
B. DATA COLLECTION 
Before the data collection process could begin, we received approval to proceed 
from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the 
protection of human subjects.  The IRB assesses the risks and benefits of proposed 
research to minimize negative impacts to individuals.  The IRB executed a complete 
review of the interview questions, interview consent form, audio consent form, 
recruitment materials, and commanding officer approval letters.  We traveled to JBSA 
and JBLM to collect the data in face-to-face interviews from June 13–17, 2011.  The 
interviews we conducted electronically occurred as late as July 6, 2011.   
We made a deliberate attempt to interview an appropriate mix of leadership, 
contracting personnel, and customers.  Because JBSA consists of three distinct 
contracting offices and JBLM consists of only one contracting office, we conducted more 
interviews at JBSA than at JBLM.  Additionally, JBSA employs nearly triple the total 
number of contracting personnel that JBLM employs.  Besides attempting to interview an 
appropriate mix of leaders, contracting personnel, and customers, we also attempted to 
interview contracting employees and customers with different experiences.  The 
customers interviewed at JBSA included civil engineering, communications, and group 
leadership who provided information on many of group functions they oversee.  The 
customers interviewed at JBLM included personnel from the fire department, public 
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works, community service, finance, joint integration office, and airlift wing.  Table 1 
summarizes the number of interviewees and their collected demographics:  
Table 1.   Demographics of Interviewees 














Joint Base San 
Antonio 35 17.5 15 6 18 16 15 12 





24 14 7 6 7 14 11 8 




19 24.4 13 0 14 9 8 6 





8 19.4 5 0 5 7 5 4 
 Contracting Customers 8 29.6 7 0 7 0 1 1 
 
C. ANALYSIS 
In order to answer our research questions, it was necessary that we analyze the 
responses of those we interviewed.  Because no two interviews were identical and 
because each individual explained the issues from a different point of view, we used an 
approach appropriate to capture all of that information.  Consistent with Ellram (1996), 
we developed a coding system to capture the information relayed to us by the 
interviewees based on the information gathered in the literature review section.  Then we 
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looked at code co-occurrences because co-occurrences provide evidence of a relationship 
between the variables.  Our initial key consisted of twelve codes using ideas exclusively 
from the literature review.  After the first iteration of coding, the recognition of the need 
for additional codes surfaced.  The pattern of an iteration of coding followed by the 
recognition of a need for additional codes continued until the final key evolved.  Table 2 
lists the initial codes and the final codes: 





Openness/Willingness to Change D 
Feedback E 
Task Uncertainty F 
Culture G 
Shared Vision H 
Positive Emotional Attractors I 
Goal/Vision J 
Strategic Sourcing K 
Contract Consolidation L 




Openness/Willingness to Change D 
Feedback E 
Task Uncertainty / Ambiguity F 
Communication G 
Culture H 
Shared Vision & Goals I 
Strategic Sourcing J 
Contract Consolidation K 
Conflict L 





The coding system helped us identify concepts that predict success for 
consolidated contracting activities.  The concepts emerged from the textual data showing 
patterns and co-occurrences of codes.  As the coding process began, the identified factors 
proved insufficient to capture the ideas and inputs of respondents.  As a result, additional 
codes were added to adequately capture the ideas and inputs of all interviewees.  The 
significance of co-occurrences in the codes is that patterns of higher coincidence 
distinguish themselves as something more than the biased opinion of an individual and 
indicate a consistent area of interest among the interviewed population.  Furthermore, it 
“strengthens the internal validity of case study findings” (Ellram, 1996, p. 111).  In an 
effort to add further reliability, the interviews were coded first by the author who 




The following section first examines the differences in organizational structures, 
identifies the significant code co-occurrences, highlights some non-coded significant 
findings, and then addresses specific questions and answers asked to interviewees.  For 
the differences in organizational structures the presentation of JBSA data occurs first, 
followed by JBLM and the combined data analysis. We use the same pattern of JBSA, 
JBLM, and a combined analysis for the significant code co-occurrences, non-coded 
significant findings, and specific questions.  We discuss these concepts and analyze the 
differences in detail in this section. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
The external organizational structures of JBSA and JBLM are diagramed below.  
The diagrams show the external organizational structures of the contracting units at JBSA 
and JBLM prior to and after consolidation.   
 






























































Figure 5.   JBLM Purchasing Organizational Structure 
The organizational structures changed at both JBSA and JBLM.  At JBSA, two of 
what were once entire training wings in the 37th Training Wing at Lackland AFB and the 
12th Flight Training Wing transformed into the support groups of the 802nd Support 
Group and 902nd Support Group, respectively.  The contracting squadrons at Lackland 
AFB and Randolph AFB made the reorganization with little more than a unit 
nomenclature change.  Conversely, the 502nd Support Group came about through the 
reorganization and renaming of several Army units on Fort Sam Houston.  The Mission 
and Installation Contracting Command (MICC) and other tenant unit contracting 
activities continued to exist and operate similarly as they did before consolidation.  In 
addition, an entirely new contracting unit emerged in the 502nd Contracting Squadron 
which took some employees from the MICC and other local contracting units during 
standup.  The 502nd Contracting Squadron’s proposed role included taking over the base 
support functions from the MICC and other tenant contracting units on Fort Sam 
Houston.  However, putting this role into practice proved more difficult than initially 







At JBLM the entire base support responsibility transferred to the Army leaving 
only direct mission performance related Air Force units.  The transfer occurred by 
merging all of the Air Force base support functions with their existing Army 
counterparts.  The Air Force contracting office, the 62nd Contracting Squadron, merged 
with the Fort Lewis MICC to become the JBLM MICC.  Civilian positions from the 62nd 
Contracting Squadron transferred to the MICC along with additional positions created by 
converting the military positions to civilian positions.  The JBLM MICC provided 
contracting support for the entire JBLM garrison following the consolidation. 
The Air Force and Army each designed their external organizational structures 
with regards to contracting in a different way.  The Air Force used a very hierarchical 
structure while the Army used a functional structure which took the Mission and 
Installation Contracting Command (MICC) out of the base chain of command entirely.  
Although the organizational structures were different, one is not necessarily better than 
the other.  As Donaldson (2001) explains extensively in the Contingency Theory of 
Organizational Design, there is no single best way to structure organizations.  Instead, 
each organization must structure itself to best fit with its environment.  JBSA and JBLM 
differ immensely in consideration of their environment, and the different structures helps 
explain some of the different experiences between the bases. 
Not only were the external organizational structures different, but the internal 
organizational structures differed as well.  Again, neither approach was superior to the 
other because of the environments’ differences (Donaldson, 2001).  Each of the JBSA 
Contracting Squadrons structured themselves slightly differently, but the general 
structures remained similar.  As seen in Figure 6, the Air Force Contracting Squadrons 
typically used a structure with a support flight, a simplified acquisition flight, a flight to 
support civil engineering, and a flight to support all other customers.  As seen in Figure 7, 
the Army’s JBLM MICC generally structured itself around the stages of the acquisition 
process with a pre-award branch and a post-award branch as well as a business operations 
division and a simplified acquisition branch.   
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Figure 6.   JBSA Typical Organizational Structure 
 
 
Figure 7.   JBLM MICC Internal Organizational Structure 
 
Based on the different organizational structures employed by the Services, there 
was a need for separate coding for JBSA and JBLM.  Coding JBSA and JBLM separately 
allowed us to see the issues unique to each base’s contracting functions because of their 

























able to see the common issues both bases experienced in both contracting offices, 
regardless of their structure.  Tables 3–5 show the coding outcomes of interviews from 
JBSA, JBLM, and combined. 
























































































































Efficiencies  0 0 2 0 2 8 5 2 5 13 4 7 44 64 
Decentralization 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Adaptability 0 0  0 0 2 0 4 0 0 1 1 0 2 5 
Openness 2 0 0  0 0 3 0 0 5 2 2 0 8 3 
Feedback 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 8 5 
Task Uncertainty 2 0 2 0 0  24 0 2 0 0 21 1 1 29 
Communication 8 0 0 3 0 24  9 2 0 0 20 0 26 42 
Culture 5 0 4 0 0 0 9  4 2 1 19 0 4 20 
Shared Vision & 
Goals 
2 0 0 0 0 2 2 4  0 1 2 0 3 5 
Strategic Sourcing 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0  4 0 2 11 3 
Contract 
Consolidation 13 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 4  0 1 9 4 
Conflict 4 0 1 2 2 21 20 19 2 0 0  1 1 27 
Unit Consolidation  7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1  13 6 
Positive/Enabler 44 1 2 8 3 1 26 4 3 11 9 1 13   
Negative/Barrier 64 3 5 3 5 29 42 20 5 3 4 27 6   
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Efficiencies  1 2 2 2 3 6 5 1 0 13 0 7 18 20 
Decentralization 1  1 1 1 0 4 2 0 0 3 0 0 1 10 
Adaptability 2 1  4 0 4 10 2 2 0 2 1 0 4 9 
Openness 2 1 4  1 1 6 2 1 0 2 0 0 1 5 
Feedback 2 1 0 1  1 5 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Task Uncertainty 3 0 4 1 1  20 8 1 0 1 5 1 2 11 
Communication 6 4 10 6 5 20  17 6 0 3 12 0 5 21 
Culture 5 2 2 2 1 8 17  9 0 0 8 4 1 5 
Shared Vision & 
Goals 
1 0 2 1 1 1 6 9  0 0 5 1 1 6 
Strategic Sourcing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
Contract 
Consolidation 13 3 2 2 0 1 3 0 0 0  2 0 6 5 
Conflict 0 0 1 0 0 5 12 8 5 0 2  2 0 5 
Unit Consolidation  7 0 0 0 1 1 0 4 1 0 0 2  4 5 
Positive/Enabler 18 1 4 1 1 2 5 1 1 0 6 0 4   
Negative/Barrier 20 10 9 5 0 11 21 5 6 0 5 5 5   
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Table 5.   Combined JBSA and JBLM Interview Coding Results 
 
C. INTERVIEW CODING RESULTS  
Tables 3–5 identified patterns and code co-occurrences found throughout the 
interviews.  Significant co-occurrences (defined as more than 20) are highlighted in Table 
5.  After coding, areas of higher coincidence co-occurrences provided evidence of 
relationships between the variables, and higher co-occurrence frequencies emerged from 
the others as concepts of significant importance based on the interviewees’ responses to 
interview questions.  Furthermore, comparing the responses with the organizational 
structure of each joint base allowed a more in-depth understanding of how the units 
operate.   
1. Consolidation and Efficiencies  
The first significant area of code co-occurrence occurred between contract 






















































































































Efficiencies  1 2 2 2 5 14 10 3 5 26 4 14 62 84 
Decentralization 1  1 1 1 0 4 2 0 0 3 0 0 2 13 
Adaptability 2 1  4 0 6 10 6 2 0 3 2 0 6 14 
Openness 2 1 4  1 1 9 2 1 5 4 2 0 9 5 
Feedback 2 1 0 1  1 5 1 1 0 2 2 1 9 3 
Task Uncertainty 5 0 6 1 1  44 8 3 0 1 26 2 3 40 
Communication 14 4 10 9 5 44  26 8 0 3 32 0 31 62 
Culture 10 2 6 2 1 8 26  13 2 1 27 4 5 25 
Shared Vision & 
Goals 
3 0 2 1 1 3 8 13  0 1 7 1 4 11 
Strategic Sourcing 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 0  4 0 2 11 3 
Contract 
Consolidation 26 3 3 4 2 1 3 1 1 4  2 1 15 9 
Conflict 4 0 2 2 2 26 32 27 7 0 2  3 1 32 
Unit Consolidation  14 0 0 0 1 2 0 4 1 2 1 3  17 11 
Positive/Enabler 62 2 6 9 9 3 31 5 4 11 15 1 17   
Negative/Barrier 84 13 14 8 5 40 62 25 11 3 9 32 11   
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achievable through contract consolidation because of fewer contracts, fewer suppliers to 
manage, and economies of scale.  JBSA has even had joint base meetings where 
individuals from multiple functional areas gathered to identify potential contract 
consolidation efforts.  Although opportunities had been identified, the execution of the 
contract consolidation efforts has been extraordinarily slow.  One JBSA employee who 
played a role in those meetings stated, “I don’t know where they are on that.  I had hoped 
they would be pretty far along” (personal communication, June 15, 2011) when asked 
about their progress.  Unfortunately, of the fourteen opportunities initially identified at 
JBSA, only three had manifested into any kind of Request for Proposal (RFP) or contract 
award at the time of the interviews.  Although the execution occurred slowly for the 
initial opportunities, plans for the remaining opportunities existed.  The contracting and 
functional squadron commanders worked together to determine optimal timing and 
technical viability for contractual actions on the remaining opportunities. 
Coding of interviews at JBLM also showed significant co-occurrence of contract 
consolidation and efficiencies.  Many interview subjects saw potential efficiencies that 
could be gained by combining contracts that currently support Fort Lewis and McChord 
Field separately into single contracts that cover the entire joint base (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011).  One JBLM 
contracting employee stated, “Having two military installations so close together where 
you could have one contract to take care of the grounds maintenance, you can take care 
of the entire installation instead of having two contracts to do the same type of work.  
That is my opinion, that the benefits to contracting would be cost savings” (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011).  Most interviewees did not believe that any potential 
efficiency had been realized at the time of the interviews (personal communication, June 
13, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Employees identified various types 
of potential efficiencies including a reduced contract administration burden (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011), savings on contractor overhead that could be passed on 
to the government (personal communication, June 14, 2011), and quantity discounts that 
could lead to a reduction in the overall contract price (personal communication, June 13, 
2011; personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 13, 2011).  
 46
Another JBLM contracting employee stated that efficiencies would likely come from 
“The administrative costs of doing a contract… because you are not doing two contracts, 
you are doing one” (personal communication, June 14, 2011). 
2.  Efficiencies and Enablers 
The next significant area of co-occurrence also dealt with efficiencies as a 
positive influence or enabler of joint base success.  One reason for the significantly 
higher occurrence of this co-occurrence compared to others was that a direct question 
(#7) was asked to leadership, contracting personnel, and customers about the efficiencies 
because of joint basing currently and any that would be found in the future.  Many JBSA 
employees indicated a very high expectation that efficiencies would be found in the 
future.  One JBSA interviewee indicated that although no savings have been seen yet, 
“we’re striving for efficiency” and confident that more would materialize in the future 
(personal communication, June 15, 2011).  This answer abounded throughout most of the 
interviews conducted at JBSA, and those believing this far outnumbered others two-to-
one (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication June 15, 2011). 
Many of the co-occurrences of efficiency and enablers at JBLM also focused on 
future contract consolidation.  Numerous subjects stated that the joint base was too 
immature to produce efficiencies at the time of the interviews, but most were optimistic 
that real benefits would occur as processes adjusted to the joint base environment 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011).  
Other subjects saw positive efficiencies from improved levels of service (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011) and reduced 
redundancy of effort (personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, 
June 14, 2011).  An example comes from the JBLM Fire Department who noted that one 
“contract went away and now it became an in-house deal.  In fact, the quality of service 
got better” (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  However, the need to hire 
additional vehicle maintenance personnel mitigated the savings from eliminating the 
contract.  These types of efficiencies provide value that may not be measured in  
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immediate monetary savings, but may lower the total cost of ownership (TCO) or 
improve mission readiness.  TCO considers all costs of an acquisition including 
procurement costs, operating costs, and disposal costs.  
3. Efficiencies and Barriers 
The negative or barrier views of efficiencies occurred significantly more than the 
positive feelings of efficiencies at JBSA.  Again, because we posed this direct question to 
leadership, contracting personnel, and customers, the high frequency of co-occurrence is 
not surprising.  JBSA personnel indicated almost unanimously that, to date, no 
efficiencies had been gained.  For some, an even more negative view of joint basing 
emerged as one JBSA employee stated, “I think that there is potential for some isolated 
efficiencies but I think the result is actually perhaps more inefficiency” (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011).  Even some of the JBSA leadership, when asked directly 
whether any efficiencies had been found or would be found in the future, responded with 
a very direct, “no” (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Even the JBSA customers 
chimed in by saying, “Unfortunately, so much money, primarily in man-hours, but also in 
trailer rental, equipment, and building renovation, has already been spent to stand up the 
AF contracting organization, that we will never ever even break even overall, much less 
save money” (personal communication, June 14, 2011). 
At JBLM, there were also more co-occurrences of efficiency and negativity than 
of efficiency and positivity, but the numbers were almost even.  Multiple contracting 
customers stated that joint basing has negatively impacted the quality of the service 
received as well as increased the required lead time for procurements (personal 
communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal 
communication, June 17, 2011).  One customer stated “Honestly, the customer support is 
less than what we had before.  Some of it is just procedural changes.  That is pretty easy 
to deal with, you just have to understand what they need, but the customer service has 
gone down” (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Another significant barrier to 
efficiency observed repeatedly was the dominance of Army processes over Air Force 
processes without considering which process was better (personal communication, June 
13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 
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2011).  This observation was almost exclusively from subjects who were, at the time of 
the interview, current or former Air Force employees and who were fairly new to the 
Army processes.  One stated: 
We were preached from the beginning that we would… take the best 
program, be it Air Force or Army and whatever was the best answer that 
was what we were going to use across the board and that was a great idea.  
I just haven’t seen it in practice yet.  It has been time after time that ‘no, 
we are going to do it the Army way’ and… it is hard to watch something 
that we know was efficient or cheaper or easier disappear.  It is frustrating. 
(personal communication, June 15, 2011)  
Another said:  
I feel like sometimes the Army is not as efficient as the Air Force was in 
their contracting and I think there could be some cost savings there as 
well… There seems to be a lot more layers for reviews of documentation 
with contract awards and things like that than the Air Force has on their 
side, which obviously takes time. (personal communication, June 13, 
2011) 
4.  Task Uncertainty and Communication 
Task uncertainty and communication was another area in which there were a high 
number of co-occurrences.  The vast majority of this co-occurrence was found in 
interviews that occurred at the 502nd Contracting Squadron.  The main reason for the 
high co-occurrences at this location was that the squadron did not exist prior to the joint 
base effort.  There were no established processes, checklists, or other directives in 
existence for the squadron prior to its creation on October 1, 2010.  With no established 
communication methods or directives in place at time of standup, the task uncertainty 
experienced by contract personnel and customers was very high.  One JBSA leader 
indicated that both the contracting personnel and customers were, “hoping they were 
going to find somebody that was going to define, ‘What am I supposed to do?’” (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  The task uncertainty and communication breakdowns 
were such a common theme for the 502nd Contracting Squadron that with some of the 
interviewees, there was little else that needed explanation (personal communication, June 
14, 2011). 
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The co-occurrence between task uncertainty and communication was among the 
most common co-occurrences of codes at JBLM.  There were two major subjects that 
caused this pattern.  First, former Air Force employees who transitioned to the Army and 
current Air Force Employees who work closely with the Army found training to be 
significantly lacking (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, 
June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 
15, 2011).  This finding was identified in interviews with both contracting personnel and 
customers, but was especially clear from the customers.  One customer stated that “The 
single biggest thing is for them to provide training because the basics are there but… they 
want paperwork written differently.  If I could back history up, they would have started 
their transition process sooner… they didn’t start it with the customers at all” (personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).The second major subject at JBLM was strategic 
communication about the joint basing process.  Many respondents indicated that there 
was an obvious effort to communicate all available information to the base population, 
but much of the information that was desired was not available (personal communication, 
June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 
16, 2011).  A common complaint was that while strategic guidance was given, there was 
no direction on what processes needed to change or how to implement the guidance 
(personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; 
personal communication, June 16, 2011).  An affected JBLM employee said: 
I think that the general picture was communicated fairly well of what they 
thought was going to happen and probably what they knew was 
happening.  The communication breakdown was above the base level.  We 
got very little from OSD and anybody that had to do with joint basing.  
When you shared relationships with other installations that were going 
through joint basing, it was different there because they were on their own 
also.  I just felt that we were all on our own at the base level and we kind 
of designed this the best we could without guidance. (personal 
communication, June 15, 2011) 
5.  Task Uncertainty and Barriers 
Another significant co-occurrence was task uncertainty as a barrier or negative 
impact.  This idea is directly in line with the literature review section because task 
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uncertainty is a barrier to effective consolidation efforts (Gresov, 1990).  At JBSA, this 
idea was repeatedly reinforced as a significant number of employees at the 502nd 
Contracting Squadron restated their negative views of the ambiguity that surrounded the 
creation of their squadron (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  One contracting 
employee expressed frustration, “everyone hasn’t captured their role from the customer 
on over to us … things are confusing and people are frustrated” (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  Others complained because, in nearly ten months of 
existence at the time of the interviews, there seemed to be even more ambiguity about 
some things than there was before (personal communication, June 14, 2011). 
Task uncertainty co-occurred with negativity during JBLM interviews numerous 
times.  The pattern was similar to task uncertainty and communication in that they 
focused around the lack of training in Army procedures (personal communication, June 
15, 2011) and the lack of actionable information on the joint basing process (personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  These were seen as barriers because they prolonged the 
transition period and prevented workers from performing efficiently when JBLM reached 
its FOC (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  A JBLM contracting customer stated 
that “I think they [the Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC)] should 
step forward with some customer training.  They have not offered that yet to step out and 
say ‘here is who we are and here is how we operate’ and let us understand what they do 
and let our people ask questions” (personal communication, June 15, 2011). 
6. Task Uncertainty and Conflict 
The final significant co-occurrence of task uncertainty was with conflict.  At 
JBSA, the greatest cause of conflict seemed to stem from the uncertainty surrounding the 
creation of this entirely new contracting squadron (personal communication, June 14, 
2011).  At Fort Sam Houston specifically, the conflict naturally grows because a 
customer’s need can go unfilled due to the uncertainties that exist on the base (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  In response to a question concerning why uncertainty 
still exists nearly a year after consolidation, a JBSA contracting employee responded, 
“There are, our best guesstimate, ten other contracting offices on this post.  We have 
never had the opportunity to sit down and discern who is supposed to be doing what … 
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and we have never had the opportunity to sit down and everyone explain what their role 
is” (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  With up to ten different purchasing offices 
on only Fort Sam Houston and unclear lines of purchasing authority drawn, it becomes 
obvious why uncertainty exists and leads to conflict.  Fort Sam Houston had numerous 
contracting units prior to consolidation to support the wide array of missions and 
numerous tenant units assigned.  Since consolidation, all of the contracting units 
continued to exist in addition to the creation of the 502nd Contracting Squadron.  The 
502nd Contracting Squadron gained responsibility for base support, but determining 
exactly what base support entailed caused even more confusion as many requirements 
bounced between the MICC and the 502nd Contracting Squadron before a determination 
of responsibility occurred.  One JBSA customer explained the task uncertainty and 
conflict by stating that “Everything we have learned about how the Air Force does 
contracting was learned exquisitely painfully by trial-and-error” (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  The uncertainty was no less frustrating to the 
contracting office, as one employee explained that the major source of their frustration 
existed because “The role certainty for our organization should have been clearly 
defined” (personal communication, June 13, 2011), but was not. 
In contrast to JBSA, interviews at JBLM had fairly low co-occurrences of task 
uncertainty and conflict.  There was significant task uncertainty coded in the interviews, 
but it did not appear to generate much conflict (personal communication, June 13, 2011; 
personal communication, June 14, 2011).  However, the average experience of personnel 
interviewed at JBLM was significantly higher than that of personnel interviewed at 
JBSA.  It is possible that the process was better communicated to the base population, 
and the understanding that everyone was operating in a similarly ambiguous environment 
forced the majority of people to work cooperatively rather than cause unnecessary 
conflict (personal communication, June 15, 2011). There is one clear, verifiable 
difference between the two joint bases—the structure of the consolidations was 
dramatically different.  JBLM combined all contracting personnel into one unit while 
JBSA used one contracting unit for each mission support group for a total of three.  The 
likely explanation for the difference is that being forced to work together in the same unit 
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actually reduced the conflict experienced when compared to maintaining separate 
contracting units.  There were some instances of conflict and it was most prevalent in 
interviews conducted with customers who had their level of contracted service reduced 
and did not understand the process used to determine the level of service (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 16, 2011). 
7. Communication and Culture 
Communication and culture were the next significant instance of co-occurring 
concepts.  JBSA had both contracting personnel and customers who were previously 
Army employees now serving as Air Force employees (personal communication, June 
13, 2011, personal communication, June 14, 2011, personal communication, June 15, 
2011).  As evidenced at JBSA, many employees expressed the differences in the cultures 
and communication from both an Army and Air Force perspective (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  “There seems to be a lot of inconsistencies between the 
Army and the Air Force” (personal communication, June 14, 2011), expressed one 
previously Army, now Air Force employee.  An Air Force employee now working on the 
Army base mentioned, “I think within their culture a lot of the things that they do and say 
are driven by position and rank” (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  The premise 
that the Army and Air Force communicate differently because of culture was explicitly 
and implicitly obvious throughout the interviews, with most respondents indicating that 
the Army communicates more directly, harshly, and negatively than their counterparts in 
the Air Force (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 
14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).   
Interviews from JBLM had more co-occurrences of communication and culture 
than did the interviews from JBSA.  Because the contracting office at JBLM combined 
the operations of an Air Force unit and an Army unit into a single contracting office 
while JBSA did not combine offices, it does make sense that the cultural differences of 
the Services would be more obvious.  Many of the co-occurrences of communication and 
culture came from statements about the difficulty of communicating with people from 
other Services (personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 
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14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Even between contracting personnel, 
the differences in acronyms, terminology, and contracting processes were substantial.  A 
contracting employee stated that “Contracting is not contracting on both sides of the 
fence.  Though we both use the FAR, each organization has its own supplements and it 
would have been better to have had some more training on the differences” (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011).  These were not all negative statements; some of them 
emphasized the importance of ensuring effective communication with those who have a 
cultural background from a different branch of service and the potential value of the joint 
experience (personal communication, June 13, 2011). 
8. Communication and Conflict 
Not only did communication have a significant co-occurrence with culture, it also 
had a significant co-occurrence with conflict.  Individuals at JBSA highlighted the 
problems caused by the differences between the Air Force and Army communication 
styles (personal communication, June 13, 2011, personal communication, June 14, 2011, 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  One JBSA employee claimed that “the Army 
will come in here and rant and rave and scream and yell … while the Air Force customers 
will come in upset, but they will say, ‘okay, let’s figure this out’ or ‘how can we work 
through this together’” (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  Another employee 
pointed out that when working with the Army, “I cannot believe how unprofessional 
when I go to a meeting that is predominately Army how unprofessional people are to one 
another” (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  The differences in communication 
led directly to organizational conflict at JBSA, and these differences are still a source of 
contention for the base (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011). 
Communication and conflict also frequently coincided in interviews at JBLM.  
Most of the co-occurrences involved miscommunication (personal communication, June 
13, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011) or a lack of communication (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal 
communication, June 16, 2011).  Given the high number of co-occurrences, it was 
surprising that there were not more instances of task uncertainty and conflict because it 
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could be expected that problems in communication would lead to task uncertainty that 
would ultimately result in conflict.  It is possible that task uncertainty was implied by 
interview subjects but was not stated clearly enough to code.  It is also possible that the 
difficulties in communication led to immediate conflicts that were solely tied to 
miscommunication and did not involve task uncertainty. 
9. Communication and Barriers 
The final significant communication co-occurrence was communication acting as 
a barrier or in a negative manner.  For JBSA, this co-occurrence occurred nearly twice as 
often as that of any other communication issue.  Specifically, the barrier was the lack of 
clear, specific communication between both individuals and differing information 
technology systems (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, 
June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  First, a number of individuals at 
every level expressed that there was insufficient communication prior to or since the 
initiation of JBSA (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, 
June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  In response to the 
communication of standing up JBSA, one leader responded, “What was the problem, was 
the understanding” (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  Despite good intentions of 
relaying information by senior leadership, one employee surmised, “They had bigger 
things, they didn’t worry about contracting” (personal communication, June 13, 2011).  
Another problem was that the Army and Air Force funding and contracting systems were 
not connected in a way that allowed them to communicate with one another after the 
creation of JBSA (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  This problem created 
additional work and was described simply as making the process “hectic” (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).   
The single most common co-occurrence of codes at JBLM was communication 
and negativity.  Communication could be considered negative for multiple reasons 
including a lack of communication (personal communication, June 15, 2011), 
miscommunication (personal communication, June 14, 2011), communicating negative 
content (personal communication, June 16, 2011), and difficulties with the 
communication process (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  One of the most 
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common communication barriers was a lack of available information (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Several people 
noted that JBLM leadership communicated available information effectively, but did not 
have the detailed information those affected by the joint-basing process desired.  Similar 
to the issues with culture and communication, the inter-service nature of the transition 
was also seen as a barrier to consolidation (personal communication, June 16, 2011).  
One issue that was specifically mentioned repeatedly was the use of acronyms (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011).  Both the Army 
and Air Force use many acronyms but even identical acronyms can have different 
meanings (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  Similar to JBSA, JBLM also had 
numerous people mention communication difficulties with finance and contracting 
computer systems (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, 
June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011). 
10. Culture and Conflict 
Another significant co-occurrence was between culture and conflict.  JBSA 
experienced extremely high conflict that was likely a function of many different factors.  
One factor that several interviewees pointed out specifically was the difference in culture 
between the Army and Air Force (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  A previously 
Army, now Air Force, JBSA employee described the process as a, “hostile take-over” 
(personal communication, June 14, 2011) in which the Air Force forced their culture on a 
storied Army base.  Conversely, a former Air Force employee now working on the Army 
base stated, “There is some resentment…their perception is—and it is easily 
understood—that we are here and we are taking over and we are going to change 
everything and that certainly is not our intent” (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  
Although JBSA employees identified culture as a source of conflict, one JBSA leader 
expressed another view, saying “With two significantly different cultures, culture could 
be a barrier or actually a catalyst for growth” (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  
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Unfortunately, because of all of the other issues occurring at JBSA, culture has become a 
target for blame instead of a catalyst for growth.   
JBLM had relatively low levels of culture and conflict coincidence compared to 
JBSA.  This coincidence is similar to the low co-occurrences of task uncertainty and 
conflict at JBLM when compared to JBSA.  The likely explanation is also similar—
JBLM contracting personnel work together in one unit while JBSA contracting personnel 
are in three separate units.  Forcing the employees to mix at JBLM may contribute to a 
reduction in conflict (personal communication, June 13, 2011).  Other possible 
explanations could be differences in leadership, employee experience, and processes used 
in consolidation.  However, similar to JBSA, one former Air Force contracting employee 
described the whole joint-basing process as a hostile take-over, but specifically stated that 
the contracting consolidation did not seem hostile (personal communication, June 16, 
2011). 
11. Culture and Barriers 
The next significant co-occurrence of codes was between culture and negativity.  
Conflict and negativity was also identified, but in most instances conflict was viewed as a 
negative effect (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 
14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  At JBSA, the culture was blamed for 
the conflict, and because conflict was generally considered negative, many viewed the 
cultural differences and combinations in a negative light.  Specifically, differences in 
culture between the way contracting was done by the Air Force versus the Army 
occurred.  Some previously Army JBSA employees feel as though the Army culture, “is a 
lot more flexible on how the customer does their requirements and actually contracts out 
their stuff and how they spend their money” (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  
However, Air Force JBSA employees counter the Army claim with, “They don’t want to 
follow the rules and you know it is amazing to me and we see it in the contracts that we 
got from the Army” (personal communication, June 14, 2011). 
Culture and negativity was another area in which JBLM had relatively few co-
occurrences compared to JBSA.  Again, the obvious difference was the different 
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organizational structures used, but that may not be the only reason behind the differences.  
In the same way that it may reduce conflict, working in the same unit may promote 
integration and understanding (personal communication, June 13, 2011).  Increased 
understanding could prevent cultural differences from being obstacles and allow 
employees with different backgrounds to work together efficiently.   
Another possible explanation could be differences in the level of commitment 
from the services.  One JBLM employee stated that former Air Force employees received 
briefings indicating that joint basing was a temporary experiment and the base would 
split in the near future (personal communication, June 16, 2011).  No former Air Force 
personnel indicated they received this briefing, but the rumor shows a lack of trust 
between the employees and the joint base structure.  It is also possible that leadership 
issues lead to the differences instead of the structure.  Without the alignment of goals and 
priorities among the leadership of each entity involved, it is likely that any structure used 
would fail to overcome cultural barriers to consolidations. 
12. Strategic Sourcing and Enablers 
The final area of co-occurrences we discuss is between the concepts of strategic 
sourcing and contract consolidation being positive, or an enabler (combined concepts 
gives 26 (see Table 5)).  JBSA is currently in the process of implementing both strategic 
sourcing and contract consolidation ideas (personal communication, June 13, 2011; 
personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  The 
majority of responses to strategic sourcing are positive, and it is viewed as a benefit to all 
of contracting.  One JBSA employee expressed this sentiment by saying, “I think we look 
at strategic sourcing a little better from the joint base perspective” (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011).  Despite set-backs with strategic sourcing at JBSA, thus 
far, a generally positive view of the concept exists.   
Strategic sourcing did not co-occur with any other coded concepts during 
interviews at JBLM.  A fundamental part of strategic sourcing is using the purchasing 
function as a strategic asset, not viewing it as an administrative support function (Ellram 
& Carr, 1994).  In the organizational structure the Army used at JBLM, the JBLM MICC 
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is a tenant organization.  It provides support for JBLM but does not fall under the 
garrison command structure.  The organizational structure provides the benefit of 
avoiding some command influence on the contracting process but also isolates the 
contracting function and may reduce the likelihood of the contracting office being 
involved in strategic planning. 
13. Non-Coded Concepts 
There were two additional, non-coded concepts that appeared mostly independent 
of other codes but with significant frequency that warrant discussion.  The first is that at 
JBSA, the manner in which personnel recognition awards are determined and handed out 
has now changed enormously with unforeseen consequences now and in the future.  The 
premise is that winning awards for base-level achievements has now become three times 
more difficult for both active duty military and civilian personnel (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  This side-effect makes Major Command and Service-
wide awards more difficult to win as well. “Now you are taking three bases and you are 
only getting one award for three bases whereas the other bases are on their own as a 
wing” (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  One JBSA employee even suggested 
that because of this added layer for stratification or awards for employees, the best 
individuals may seek to work elsewhere to further their own careers (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011). 
Manpower issues were the other additional concepts that multiple people 
mentioned at both JBSA and JBLM (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Contracting 
personnel at each JBSA location stated that they needed additional staffing to 
successfully accomplish their mission.  At JBLM, the main concern was vacancies.  
There were 25 positions transferred to the MICC as a result of joint basing and only 
former Air Force civilian personnel transferred while the active duty military did not.  
The active duty military positions converted to six civilian positions using an Air Force 
formula and transferred to the MICC (personal communication, June 13, 2011).  Both 
situations create additional difficulty and stress in addition to the joint basing 
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consolidation.  At JBLM, this is further complicated by the fact that the former Air Force 
employees are members of a different labor union than the employees who were Army 
employees prior to joint basing.  As a result, employees’ privileges vary and there is 
some tension and confusion with office policies and issues (personal communication, 
June 14, 2011). 
D. SELECTED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS  
 
 
At JBSA, three answers dominated all others in answering the first half of this 
question.  They included saving money, finding efficiencies, and fulfilling customer 
requirements.  Since finding efficiencies usually involves saving money (through reduced 
times, resources, or contract actions), the combined idea of saving dominated answers at 
JBSA with 23 of 35 respondents indicating savings equaled success (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  Some respondents indicated both savings and fulfilling 
customer requirements defined success as 12 of 35 interviewees specifically called out 
meeting customer requirements (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  The responses 
indicated that the identification of success for contracting in the joint base environment 
did not change between Contracting Personnel, Contracting Leadership, and Customers.  
No trends existed in identifying changes to make successes happen. 
At JBLM, the most common definitions of success for joint base contracting were 
the consolidation of contracts and gaining efficiencies.  Of the 19 people interviewed at 
JBLM, 14 of them included contract consolidation in their answer, but not all thought that 
this would lead to significant cost savings (personal communication, June 13, 2011; 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Demographic and General Questions 
6 
How would you define success for contracting in the joint base 
environment?  What, if anything, would you change to bring about 
that success(es)? 
X X X 
 
 60
personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; 
personal communication, June 16, 2011).  Many saw the utility of contract consolidation 
in the reduction of contracting work since redundant contracts could be eliminated which 
would allow contracting personnel to put more effort into the remaining contracts and to 
provide better service to their customers.  All respondents who discussed increased 
customer service believed that it would be more beneficial than the potential cost savings 
of reducing the contracting workforce based on the lighter workload.  Those who thought 
efficiencies were the main goal for joint basing included cost savings, improved customer 
service, and administrative savings from fewer contracts.  These answers were consistent 
across all three categories of interviewed personnel but there were multiple customers 
who stated that they did not think contracting would change at all or contribute 
significantly to any joint basing successes.  There were no trends in recommended 
changes to bring about success, but some suggestions included increased training, 




Answers to Question 8 were similar to the answers respondents gave to Question 
6 above.  Only 3 of 35 interviewees gave a starkly different answer between the 
questions, and all gave answers that directly related to savings in Question 8 (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  Based on these responses, contracting squadrons at 
JBSA have an obvious perspective that the focus of joint basing is monetary, but none of 
the interviewees indicated they knew specific savings goals.  This coincides in part with 
some of the main goals of BRAC, including optimizing efficiency and maximizing the 
joint utilization of resources. 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Demographic and General Questions 
8 What do you see as the objectives of joint basing?  Do you believe joint basing will achieve its intended objectives?  Why or why not? X X X 
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The answers provided at JBLM were very different from JBSA in that very few 
focused on monetary savings.  Only 2 of the 19 respondents indicated they believed that 
monetary savings were a primary objective of joint basing (personal communication, 
June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 
15, 2011; personal communication, June 16, 2011).  Many others said that other various 
efficiencies, similar to those discussed as answers to question 6 above, were the objective 
of joint basing.  Process efficiency by using best practices of the combined units was also 
discussed as an objective.  A couple of people stated that the objective appeared to be to 
create a joint base and nothing more.  This is interesting, as it appears the guidance to the 
joint bases was simply to create a joint base and not to achieve savings or other 
efficiencies.  The majority of interviewees stated that it was too early to tell whether or 




Very little good news surfaced at JBSA in response to Question 11.  Only one 
positive trend existed for the strengths in structure change, and it occurred predominately 
at the 502nd Contracting Squadron at Fort Sam Houston.  A surprisingly high 5 of 8 
Contracting personnel at the 502nd Contracting Squadron answered this question with the 
strength being squadron leadership (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  The fact 
that over half of the interviewees would independently identify squadron leadership as a 
strength speaks volumes to respect and admiration the contracting personnel had for their 
contracting leadership.  Other individuals at both the 802nd and 902nd Contracting 
Squadrons also indicated squadron leadership as a strength, but less frequently (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Unfortunately, 
more than half of individuals indicated a weakness of some kind which buried that one 
piece of good news.  No real trends existed in weakness identification either as fifteen 
unique issues surfaced.  Furthermore, a full 10 individuals across JBSA answered directly 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Governance Structure Questions 
11 What are the strengths and weaknesses to changes in structure? X X  
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that no strengths came because of the changes in structure (personal communication, June 
13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 
2011). 
At JBLM, the majority of interviewees stated that their structure did not change.  
This was true for all interviewees who were Army employees before joint basing 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 16, 2011).  The 
employees who noted differences provided a mix of strengths and weaknesses and often 
what one person perceived as a strength, another would see as a weakness.  The most 
common indicated strengths were the use of separate pre-award and post-award sections 
within the contracting unit and the fact that the contracting unit is a tenant unit and does 
not fall under the garrison command structure.  Similarly, these were also the most 
common weaknesses identified.  While not an organizational structure issue, several 
personnel stated that the fact that the entire contracting unit was not together in the same 
building was a weakness. 
 
 
At JBSA Question 13 received nearly unanimous answers indicating a well-
defined chain of command (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  However, 
Question 14 split the respondents almost exactly in half with regards to if the chain of 
command was still well-defined.  The split occurred along the lines of what they 
considered their chain of command.  This surfaced explicitly as many who indicated the 
chain was no longer well-defined mentioned that the disconnect occurred at the wing 
level.  Those who looked above the squadron and group levels explained the new chain of  
 
 Questions Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 




Was your chain of command well-defined?   
 
Is your chain of command well-defined?   
X X  
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command as being convoluted or imprecise.  One respondent mentioned that the chain of 
command is well-defined, but only on paper, and definitely not in practice (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011). 
Respondents at JBLM were similarly unanimous in stating that their chain of 
command was well-defined prior to joint basing (personal communication, June 13, 
2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; 
personal communication, June 16, 2011).  The JBLM responses differed from JBSA in 
that they were also unanimous that the chain of command was well-defined after the 
consolidation.  The structure of the chain of command changed significantly for the 
employees that transitioned from the Air Force to the Army.  The Air Force chain of 
command followed a typical Air Force structure with the contracting squadron under a 
mission support group that was subordinate to a wing.  Under the Army structure, the 
contracting office is a tenant unit on the base and the entire chain of command for 
contracting above the MICC director is at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. 
 
 
A separation exists between chain of command authority and contracting 
authority for Air Force individuals.  After the standup of JBSA, nothing changed 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  At JBLM, all of the former Air Force 
employees interviewed stated that prior to joint basing they had two clearly separate 
chains of command, one for command authority and one for contracting authority 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 16, 2011).  This was not as clear on the Army side because 
both the command authority and contracting authority come from the same organization.  
Several people stated that they thought that the lines of authority were separate because 
different people held responsibility for the different areas although they were in the same 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Governance Structure Questions 
15 Did you have a separate chain of command for contracting authority?  How did this change after joint basing? X X  
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organization (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 
2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 16, 2011).  
Nobody indicated that they experienced any conflict because of this set-up.  The 
contracting office at JBLM does not directly provide contracting support for their 
superior command, MICC headquarters. 
 
 
The 502nd Contracting Squadron at Fort Sam Houston had the most conflict with 
customers of the three JBSA contracting squadrons.  This increased frequency of conflict 
evolved naturally as the squadron began operations and changing processes which existed 
previously.  Despite the increased frequency at the 502nd Contracting Squadron, the 
answers across all three bases aligned as both Contracting Personnel and Contracting 
Leadership indicated solving the problem at the lowest level, finding common ground, 
and meeting mission requirements resolved most conflicts (personal communication, 
June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 
15, 2011).  A last resort identified by several interviewees included elevating the problem 
to an appropriate decision-making level if no other resolution satisfied both parties.   
The methods of dealing with conflict at JBLM were very similar to those used at 
JBSA.  The focus was on dealing with issues at the lowest level but using the chain of 
command when needed.  According to the contracting personnel interviewed, pervasive 
attitude across the base was that mission accomplishment is clearly the top priority and 
that cooperation was more productive than conflict (personal communication, June 13, 
2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011).  As a result, while the incidence of 
miscommunication and cultural misunderstandings were high, significant conflict was 
rare. 
 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Governance Structure Questions 




Only one contractual process changed because of joint basing at JBSA for the two 
Air Force base contracting squadrons.  This one change simply added another layer of 
review for certain contract actions through the wing level.  Since the Fort Sam Houston 
502nd Contracting Squadron did not exist prior to JBSA, everything changed concerning 
the contractual processes.  At the time of the interviews, the 502nd Contracting Squadron 
just released a guide for contracting and customers on the process of getting a contract 
awarded.  Some interviewees hoped this guide would finally give both customers and 
contracting clear direction as the contracting processes seemed in a constant state of 
fluctuation from the time of squadron standup through when the interviews occurred 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).   
At JBLM, the Army processes changed very little.  Two notable changes were 
that they began accepting Air Force Form 9 funding documents and started using 
approving officials in the GPC program.  These were very minor changes but the funding 
document acceptance involved some effort because computer systems did not 
communicate with each other.  The use of approving officials resulted from payment 
issues with the bank, so it was not actually a policy change due to joint basing (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011).  The former Air Force employees saw significant 
process changes as they transitioned to the Army (personal communication, June 13, 
2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 16, 2011).  
One major change was the transition from the Air Force’s cradle-to-grave contracting to 
the Army’s use of pre-award and post-award sections.  Another significant change was 
that more reviews were required, starting at lower dollar values.  This increased the lead 
time on awarding contracts and was a significant complaint from Air Force customers.  
There was no consensus on process changes that would make the joint base more  
 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Contracting Process Questions 
22 What processes changed because of joint basing?  What processes need to change to make joint basing more effective? X X  
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effective, but most of the former Air Force employees said that additional training on the 




The process of receiving requirements prior to joint basing at JBSA only existed 
at the two Air Force base contracting squadrons.  The process remained unchanged as 
unchanged customers identified a need, described it according to base procedures set 
forth by the contracting squadrons, and brought it to the contracting squadrons for action 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Fort 
Sam Houston’s 502nd Contracting Squadron had no requirements prior to its creation, 
and a standardized process flow of receiving requirements did not exist.  Each 
requirement came in through different channels in a myriad of forms to the contracting 
office (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  Again, with the creation and 
distribution of the contracting process guide, many hoped the current senselessness would 
end.   
The process of receiving requirements at JBLM was comparable to the process 
used at the Air Force base contracting squadron at JBSA described above and similarly, 
the process was already in place prior to consolidation.  The only significant difference 
was that the Air Force customers found the guidance on the process of submitting 
requirements from Army contracting office lacking (personal communication, June 15, 
2011).  This included assistance with developing statements of work and understanding 
what documentation was required.  The response from Army personnel was that the Air 
Force contracting office had been doing too much of the customer’s work before the 
consolidation (personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 
 Questions Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 




What was the process flow of receiving requirements prior to joint 
basing?   
What is the process flow of receiving requirements since joint 
basing? 
X X  
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16, 2011).  With the exception of the level of guidance and assistance, there were no 
significant changes in the requirement submission process due to consolidation. 
 
 
Acquisition planning and acquisition priorities addressed in Questions 27 thru 30 
showed two facts at JBSA.  First, acquisition planning and prioritization authority was 
unknown.  Contracting personnel and contracting leadership believed the responsibility 
rested on the contracting squadron, functional commanders, group leadership, or wing 
leadership.  Second, every individual who believed the responsibility for acquisition 
planning and prioritization rested above the squadron level since joint basing also 
indicated that the identified level of planning and prioritization was not effective 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  JBSA contracting individuals did not see any 
value added in the involvement of group or wing leadership in acquisition planning or 
prioritization.  Some of the interviewees in contracting felt as though the wing leadership 
commanded too far removed from the base to perform effective acquisition planning or 
prioritization, while others felt as though they lacked the expertise to perform acquisition 
planning or prioritization for the base (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011). 
Prior to consolidation at JBLM, both the Army and Air Force contracting offices 
used similar procedures for acquisition planning.  Each office developed an annual plan 
that projected major acquisitions they anticipated during the coming year.  The expected 
requirements were then given to a certain section of the contracting office for award.  The 
Army had a specific pre-award section that awarded all of its requirements while the Air 
Force distributed requirements to sections based on the requirement and customer 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 




At what level was acquisition planning occurring prior to joint 
basing? At what level does acquisition planning occur since joint 
basing? Who determined acquisition priorities prior to joint basing? 
Was it effective?  Who determines acquisition priorities since joint 
basing?  Is it effective? 
X X  
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(personal communication, June 13, 2011).  For both services, priorities were established 
by the section to which acquisitions were assigned and both services found this method to 
be adequate (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 
2011).  Since consolidation, the only change has been that all requirements are processed 
in the Army manner since the Air Force office no longer exists.  The consolidation 
happened recently so it may be too early to determine whether or not it is successful, but 




The individuals who experienced process changes were concentrated in the 502nd 
Contracting Squadron at Fort Sam Houston.  For those interviewees, nearly everyone 
indicated that the process changes have had a negative impact (personal communication, 
June 14, 2011).  Specifically, the customers indicated very strongly that the changes 
impacted their units in extremely negative ways.  The customers cited significant time 
lost causing longer lead times for contract awards resulting in mission degradation. 
At JBLM, the process changes were noted by the contracting personnel and 
customers who transitioned from the Air Force to the Army and the customers that 
remained in the Air Force following consolidation but began receiving support from 
Army contracting.  Both the contracting personnel and the customers noted the increased 
lead time as a negative (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  Customers also found the separation of pre-award and 
post-award functions frustrating because it created uncertainty in knowing who to contact 
for issues with contracts.  The contracting personnel who moved from the Air Force to 
the Army were not certain whether the pre-award and post-award organization was good, 
bad or neutral with individuals presenting all three points of view. 
 Question Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Contracting Process Questions 




Across all three locations at JBSA, no interviewee expressed the way 
communication with customers occurred changed. E-mail, telephone, and face-to-face 
communication with customers continued as the means of communication at JBSA 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Similarly, at JBLM there were no real changes 
in the manner of communication with customers or the media used.  Two customers 
mentioned problems with knowing with whom they needed to communicate in response 
to other questions, but did not mention any changes in the way communication took place 
(personal communication, June 15, 2011). 
 
 
The second part of Question 41 evoked some of the strongest responses of all 
questions asked to interviewees.  The means of communicating the joint base process 
differed between individuals as some received briefings, e-mails, attended town-hall 
meetings or professional organization meetings, and others received nothing at all.  This 
occurred across all of JBSA where some individuals received information and others did 
not (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  When asked if it was clear, individuals at 
Lackland AFB and Randolph AFB were split in their responses.  Roughly half believed 
the joint base process communication occurred clearly while the other half believed it 
was not.  However, every single answering individual at the 502nd Contracting Squadron 
located at Fort Sam Houston indicated that the processes’ communication was not clear.   




40 Has the way you communicate with your customer changed since joint basing?  If so, how?  X X  
 




41 How was the process of joint basing communicated to affected employees?  Was it clear? X X  
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At JBLM, three primary methods were used to communicate the joint-basing 
process:  town hall meetings, a joint newspaper, and joint strategic engagement.  Two of 
these three, town hall meetings and the joint newspaper directly targeted affected 
employees (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  Most respondents (8 out of 11) 
indicated that the communication was clear and effective (personal communication, June 
13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 
2011; personal communication, June 16, 2011).  However, many thought that a lot of 
useful information was not provided but blamed higher levels of DoD rather than JBLM 
leadership and the communication process.  Those who did not think the communication 
was clear similarly focused on the lack of detailed information rather than the method and 
process of communication. 
 
 
The way leadership communicated with its employees did change after the 
creation of JBSA.  The majority of respondents across all three bases indicated that the 
information or delivery of the information changed (personal communication, June 13, 
2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  
Since one wing commander holds responsibility for three bases instead of one at JBSA, 
employees indicated they receive less face-to-face time and more e-mails from their 
leadership.  Additionally, the information was less precise since delivery occurred to 
three different locations with three different missions.  No individuals indicated the 
changes as a good difference, but a few mentioned the change of communication as a bad 
thing for the base. 
There was very little change in the way leadership communicated at JBLM.  
Several people observed the fact that immediately prior to and during the consolidation 
process the volume of communication was abnormally high, but it receded after reaching 




44 Has the way your leadership communicated with you changed since joint basing?  If so, how? X X  
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FOC (personal communication, June 13, 2011; June 16, 2011).  The town hall meetings 
discussed above were instituted to provide information about the joint basing process and 
concluded less than a year after FOC. 
 
 
Contracting Leadership across JBSA agreed on two barriers encountered as a 
result of joint basing.  Over half of the leaders indicated that both ambiguity and culture 
acted as barriers throughout the joint basing process (personal communication, June 13, 
2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  
Commanders and Directors did identify other barriers as individuals, but culture and 
ambiguity occurred across interviewees.  As evidenced in the coding results as well, 
culture and ambiguity acted as barriers to the effective creation and implementation of 
JBSA.  
The contracting leadership at JBLM consistently identified two barriers to the 
joint-basing process that they encountered.  The first was the fact that they lost a 
significant number of personnel during the consolidation process.  A total of 25 civilian 
contracting jobs were authorized to transfer from the Air Force to the Army, 19 jobs that 
were originally civilian and 6 new civilian jobs that replaced the active duty portion of 
the contracting squadron.  Of these 25 slots, only 13 personnel actually made the 
transition with many others leaving for other federal jobs rather than go through the 
consolidation (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 
14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  This added significant difficulty to 
the process since fewer people than needed were available for the increased workload.  
Additionally, office space was a barrier to successful consolidation as the contracting 
office was in two different locations, one on the main area of Fort Lewis and one on what 
used to be McChord Air Force Base (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal 




52 What barriers did you encounter to joint basing?  X  
 
 72
communication, June 16, 2011).  This created difficulty for communications and 
meetings and was a barrier to a successful consolidation. 
 
 
Upon the creation of JBSA, the opportunity for improvement by finding best 
practices of each service afforded itself to each squadron.  Unfortunately, at the time of 
the interviews, no implementation of best practices between services had occurred 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  Squadron leadership did acknowledge their 
intentions to share best practices between services and squadrons, but in the 8 months 
since JBSA stand-up none had occurred.   
There were a couple of practices that JBLM adopted from the Air Force after 
consolidation.  Both were in the GPC program; one was a method for tracking and 
monitoring accounts and the other was the use of approving official instead of billing 
officials, but that change was occurring throughout the Army, not because of joint basing 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011).  The lack of the use of best practices was a 
source of frustration for many former Air Force employees who saw the Army process as 
less efficient due to the longer lead time, but generally understood that Army policies 
must be followed since the Army was the lead agency for JBLM (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011). 
 
 




57 Were any policies or practices from the other service adopted by the unit?  X  
 







Have you had any issues with the level or quality of pre-award 
support from customers since consolidation?  Have you had any 
issues with the level or quality of post award/administration since 
consolidation? 
 X  
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Only the Contracting Leadership at the newly formed 502nd Contracting 
Squadron answered affirmatively to issues of pre-award support, while the other two 
squadrons responded negatively (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  The focus of 
the pre-award support from customers rested on the grave uncertainty which existed at 
time of standup and the natural frustration which followed.  In response to post award 
questions, every base responded they experienced a diminished level of support since 
consolidation.  Again, the response of Contracting Leadership expressed the main reason 
behind the perceived falling level of contract administration rested in the ambiguity 
which followed the creation and stand-up of JBSA.  
At JBLM, there were no major issues with customers for pre-award or post-award 
noted by the contracting leadership.  One leader stated that the education process of the 
customers was ongoing and it would take more time to ensure everyone was familiar with 
the Army processes, documents and requirements (personal communication, June 13, 
2011).  There was no formal, ongoing education process but would be accomplished by 
contracting personnel working individually with their customers. 
 
 
The Customers validated and echoed much of what the Contracting Leadership 
had expressed throughout JBSA.  Those at the 802nd and 902nd Mission Support Groups 
located at Randolph AFB and Lackland AFB explained that nothing changed for them 
due to the creation of JBSA (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  The customers of the 502nd Mission Support Group 
also echoed the concerns and frustrations the Contracting Leadership at that base 
discussed (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  The mass ambiguity frustrated 




68 Has the quality, responsiveness, or type of interaction and service with contracting changed since consolidation?  How?   X 
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Customers as well, and the lack of preparation in the creation of the 502nd Contracting 
Squadron further infuriated those whose contracts became affected.   
Customers at JBLM who were with the Army prior to joint basing reported no 
changes in their interactions with contracting.  Former and current Air Force customers 
addressed a variety of issues including difficulty with knowing who to contact in 
contracting and diminished support with defining requirements and getting packages 
submitted to contracting (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  There were no noted 
improvements in the responsiveness or interactions with contracting by any customers. 
 
 
Similar to Question 68 above, only the customers at Fort Sam Houston who 
changed contracting offices expressed any changes even occurring.  Unfortunately, the 
customers at Fort Sam Houston who responded all indicated the changes as being not 
only negative, but extraordinarily negative for the same reasons as those listed previously 
(personal communication, June 14, 2011). 
The customers who had been supported by Army contracting before joint basing 
did not see any significant changes at JBLM, so they did not see any as positive or 
negative.  The former and current Air Force employees generally thought the changes 
were negative and the longer lead time for awarding contracts was the most commonly 
cited reason (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 
2011).  There was hope expressed by several customers that the joint-basing process 
would eventually lead efficiencies that could help them do more with their budget, but 
their interactions with contracting through the time of the interviews had not shown any 
positive changes (personal communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 
16, 2011). 
  








The results of this study indicate that in at least 2 of the 12 joint bases across 
DoD, the contracting organizations did not receive appropriate consideration prior to base 
consolidation.  Furthermore, in at least 2 of the 12 joint bases, the designation of FOC of 
the joint bases applied to the contracting organizations in name only, as optimal 
consolidated operations remained elusive.  We found internal organizational problems 
that will likely be important information to current and future contracting leadership.  
However, the findings applicable to current and future base leadership may be more 
significant, thus are elaborated below.   
The findings provide current contracting leadership with information about 
problems encountered during consolidation, some of which persist.  The identification of 
existing problem areas is important to current leadership because it provides an outside 
perspective on issues that may not be obvious to those involved with the consolidation.  
More importantly, the identification of existing problems and those that occurred during 
the consolidation process provide an excellent source of lessons learned for future 
contracting consolidations.  This information may assist the people responsible for future 
contracting consolidations in avoiding some of the difficulties experienced at JBSA and 
JBLM. 
These findings are important to base leadership because without proper support 
and consideration given to contracting, the mission may be negatively impacted.  Both 
bases experienced some sort of failure in the contracting functional area after 
consolidation.  In some instances, the government overpaid for bridge contracts, mission 
stoppages occurred, service levels were reduced without consent from customers, and 
work continued outside of compliance with acquisition regulations (both intentionally 
and unintentionally).  Given expected budget reductions, growing concerns over 
adherence to contract regulations, and the increased reliance on contractors for mission 
accomplishment, current and future leadership must recognize the key role played by 
contracting organizations and include them at the strategic level. 
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For the current and future consolidation efforts, installation leaders need to meet 
with contracting leaders to resolve any inconsistencies or ambiguities in the contracting 
process, specifically the roles each unit plays in achieving a successful contract.  Specific 
lines of contractual authority and contractual support must be drawn across all the 
consolidating units to avoid confusion.  Additionally, the lines of communication 
between installation leaders and contracting must be fully open and two-directional at all 
times.  Differences in organizational structure in contracting act as neither a barrier nor 
enabler, but ensuring the structure fits correctly into the environment remains paramount 
if the base desires effective and efficient mission execution.  The structures used at each 
joint base mirrored structures used throughout their respective lead Services.  However, 
given their current outputs, the structures employed were probably not ideal for the 
situation (Donaldson, 2001).  Taking these steps is pivotal to achieve the overall BRAC 
goals of cost savings, transformation, improvement of capabilities, and enhancement of 
military value (Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005) by improving 




A. INTRODUCTION  
Consolidating the purchasing functions at JBSA and JBLM may have been a 
drastic change for those affected, but the concept is no different than the consolidation 
and mergers of organizations across the world occurring daily.  The purpose of BRAC 
included the gaining of the fiscal advantages typically associated with consolidating 
functions.  However, the consolidating organizations did not appear to share the BRAC 
objectives.   
The 2005 BRAC Commission Report estimated savings of $183.8 million per 
year from the 12 joint-basing initiatives.  This included savings from the elimination of 
an estimated 2,121 redundant DoD personnel, 611 of which were from JBSA and JBLM 
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005).  Multiple contracting 
leaders stated that they were not aware of any specific personnel savings goals due to 
joint basing (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 
2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011) and all DoD civilian personnel received 
guarantees that their positions would remain after the consolidation (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011).  Since the 
individual joint bases were not responsible for savings and their only assigned mission 
was to establish joint bases, they established the joint bases without regard for the overall 
objectives of BRAC.  The misalignment of goals, failure to establish objectives other 
than base creation, and lack of accountability for the BRAC objectives led to the joint 
bases focusing on achieving FOC rather than gaining lasting efficiencies and 
accomplishing broader goals.   
Using the case study methodology, the focus remained on answering the research 
questions and identifying ways for other consolidated purchasing organizations to 
improve.  We identified specific factors contributing to the organizational successes of 
joint base contracting.  After identifying changes that occurred at each base, we now 
identify the changes as strengths or weaknesses in terms of structure, processes, and 
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communication.  This process relied heavily on the extensive literature review covering 
the contingency theory of organizational design, mergers and acquisitions, change 
management, and strategic sourcing.  Improvement for JBSA and JBLM is within reach, 
but the full attainment of BRAC goals remains highly unlikely.  Other organizations 
throughout the Air Force, the DoD, and other federal, state, and local government 
organizations should gain valuable insight from this research.   
B. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
1. What Are the Barriers to Effective Consolidation?   
2. What Are the Enablers to Effective Consolidation?  
The answers to the first two research questions were found in our literature 
review.  Our literature review revealed numerous factors that impact the success of a 
functional consolidation.  Many of these factors increase the likelihood of success with 
their presence, while others reduce the likelihood of success.  Senge (1990) showed that 
the presence or absence of the factors does not guarantee the success or failure of a 
consolidation, but they do serve as predictors.  Additionally, Senge (1990) asserted that 
the absence of predictors to success may be a predictor of failure.  Therefore, the barriers 
and enablers to effective consolidation are, to at least some degree, dependent upon the 
presence or absence of the following factors.   
The contingency theory of organizational design identifies five major factors that 
significantly influence the success of consolidation:  formalization, decentralization, 
adaptability, effective feedback processes, and task uncertainty.  The first four 
(formalization, decentralization, adaptability, and effective feedback processes) are 
enablers of successful consolidation when present and act as a barriers to consolidation 
when absent.  Task uncertainty acts in the opposite manner because it is an enabler when 
absent and a barrier when present.   
The M&A literature identified six significant predictors of a successful 
consolidation:  culture shock, adaptability, openness, shared vision, positive emotional 
attractors, and the understanding of the goal by all stakeholders.  The first predictor, 
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culture shock, is a barrier when present and an enabler when it is absent.  The other five 
predictors are enablers when present and barriers when absent. 
The change management literature identified three major factors that impact the 
success of consolidations:  communicated vision, empowered employees, and positive 
culture change.  Each of these factors are enablers when present and barriers when 
absent.  Vision and culture were also factors identified in the M&A literature, and an 
empowered employee is very similar to the idea of decentralization that is found in the 
contingency theory of organization design literature. 
Table 6.   Enablers and Barriers of Effective Consolidation 
Enablers if Present & 
Barriers if Absent 
Barriers if Present & 
Enablers if Absent 
Formalization Task Uncertainty 
Decentralization Culture Shock 
Adaptability  
Effective Feedback  
Openness  
Shared Vision  
Positive Emotional Attractors  
Goal Understanding  
Communicated Vision  
Empowered Employees  
Positive Culture Change  
 
3. What Processes, Governance Structures, Organizational Structures, 
and Communication Lines and Mediums Are Currently Being 
Employed?   
At JBSA, the processes currently being employed by the Contracting Squadrons 
vary between the three locations.  The process of receiving requirements, executing 
contracts, administering contracts, and closing out contracts remained unchanged for the 
802nd and 902nd Contracting Squadrons.  The process includes customer stops at the 
local comptroller squadron, personnel, contracting, security forces, and civil engineering 
as applicable for services, supplies, or construction processes.  A significant process 
problem at the 502nd Contracting Squadron existed because no standardized processes 
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existed.  However, at the time of interviews, the release of the aforementioned customer 
guide sought to solve this ambiguity and to follow contracting processes similar to that of 
the 802nd and 902nd Contracting Squadrons. 
For the Army MICC at JBLM, the contracting processes changed slightly to 
accept Air Force funding documents and to use approving officials instead of billing 
officials in the GPC program.  While there were significant differences in processes 
between the Air Force and the Army, most did not change.  The Army used different 
forms and terminology, but the basic structure of awarding, administering, and closing 
contracts did not change.  The most notable changes included lower thresholds for certain 
documentation and review requirements and additional layers of review.  Additionally, 
while no formal processes changed, the level of pre-award assistance with requirement 
definition was much lower than Air Force customers had previously experienced.  There 
was no difference in the use of contract types or evaluation factors during source 
selections.  There was no significant change in the acquisition planning process, and the 
current process for the consolidation of requirements at JBLM relies on the consolidation 
of customers, not changes in the contracting process. 
The governance structure includes the rules, roles, and responsibilities the 
contracting organizations follow in meeting mission requirements.  Each squadron at 
JBSA, including the 502nd Contracting Squadron supporting Fort Sam Houston, 
followed Air Force procedures including the Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (AFFARS), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 
and Air Education and Training Command (AETC) mandatory procedures.  Furthermore, 
each base created local operating instructions further dictating roles and responsibilities 
of squadron members.  No personnel performance evaluations or standards of roles and 
responsibilities changed after FOC at JBSA.  Finally, the contracting authority for all 
three locations comes from AETC headquarters.   
At JBLM, the governance structures for the MICC remained unchanged due to 
joint basing.  The contracting authority comes from the Mission and Installation 
Contracting Command headquarters at Fort Sam Houston.  Since the Army was the lead 
service for JBLM, the base used Army guidance and procedures, including the Army 
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Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), DFARS, and DoD directives.  
The contracting office created local guidance for joint-basing specific issues.  The 
personnel performance evaluations and standards did not change after FOC for the 
personnel who remained with the Army and changed very little for the personnel that 
transitioned from the Air Force to the Army. 
The organizational structure at JBSA looks similar to the organizational structures 
of the three individual bases prior to FOC.  Previously, Fort Sam Houston base 
requirements went to the MICC for support, and the requirements for both Randolph 
AFB and Lackland AFB flowed to the same local Contracting Squadrons.  Now, a 
different mission support group (MSG) supports each of the three geographically separate 
bases, and a separate Contracting Squadron supports each MSG.  The contracting 
squadrons fall in the chain of command of their respective MSGs at JBSA.  Each 
squadron provides “cradle-to-grave” contracting, where a single contract specialist and 
contracting officer normally work on a requirement throughout the entire process from 
acquisition planning to contract closeout.   
At JBLM, the MICC supports the garrison command structure, but is a tenant 
unit.  Its chain of command, like its contracting authority, comes from the Army’s MICC.  
This was very different from the JBSA approach where each Contracting Squadron 
supported units that shared its chain of command.  The JBLM MICC used separate pre-
award and post-award functions for the contracting process instead of the cradle-to-grave 
approach preferred at JBSA.  This means that an individual assigned to the pre-award 
section would award a contract and someone else, from the post-award section, would 
administer and close it out.  
Communication lines employed remained unchanged since the creation of JBSA.  
The primary method of communication continues to be e-mail, but other methods are also 
employed in the manner determined appropriate by the sender and higher ranking 
official.  Formal communication comes from the joint base command structure to each 




teamwork between the Contracting Squadrons exists only to ensure fulfillment of 
Common Output Level Standards (COLS), predominately informal communications take 
place among the Contracting Squadrons. 
During the joint-basing transition at JBLM, the base-wide strategic 
communication plan included three major areas:  a command information plan, a public 
awareness campaign, and rebranding operations.  The methods used to communicate 
these messages included mass briefings by leadership, briefings to unit leaders that could 
be passed on to subordinates, the base newspaper, and public media.  Since FOC, the 
base newspaper and mass briefings have continued.  Within the MICC, most employees 
preferred face-to-face communication but the use of e-mail and telephone calls was 
prevalent, especially due to the dispersion of customers and the post-award section not 
being collocated with the rest of the office. 
4. What Are the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Current Approach(es) 
to Consolidation by the United States Air Force and the United States 
Army?   
The Air Force at JBSA and the Army at JBLM took very different approaches to 
the consolidation for joint basing.  Each approach had different strengths and areas for 
improvement.  It is important to note that because each situation is different, a weakness 
in one approach may work well in another situation just as a strength at one base may not 
translate to a strength in another circumstance.  The strengths and weaknesses of the 
Services’ approaches to consolidation were determined by analyzing interview responses, 
using the literature review, and coding the results.  These results are shown in Table 7 








Table 7.   Strengths and Weaknesses Identified at JBSA 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Contracting Squadron Leadership Goal Incongruence  
Strategic Sourcing Focus Task Uncertainties 
Communication with Other 
Contracting Squadrons  
Communication with Customers and 
Wing Leadership 
Openness of Contracting Squadrons  Lack of Shared Vision 
Channels to Provide Feedback Culture Shock 
 Organizational Structure 
 Lack of Adaptability 
 Lack of Formalization 
 Leadership Considering Contracting Administrative 
 Lack of Positive Emotional Attractors 
 Lack of Empowered Employees 
 Lack of Decentralization 
 
Table 8.   Strengths and Weaknesses Identified at JBLM 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Channels to Provide Feedback Goal Incongruence  
Openness Leadership Considering Contracting Administrative Function 
Adaptability Lack of Strategic Sourcing Focus 
Lack of Culture Shock External Communication 
Lack of Conflict Task Uncertainties 
Contracting Leadership Customer Education 
 Lack of Best Practices 
 Lack of Formalization 
 Lack of Positive Emotional Attractors 
 Lack of Empowered Employees 
 Lack of Positive Culture Change 
 
At JBSA, the strengths of the consolidation were all found internal to the 
Contracting Squadrons.  One example was the strength of squadron leadership across all 
three base contracting squadrons.  Many of the employees, especially those located at the 
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502nd Contracting Squadron at Fort Sam Houston, identified this strength specifically 
throughout the interviews.  This strength in local leadership helped minimize the barriers 
and increase the enablers of effective consolidation identified in research questions 1 & 2.  
Without the strong, local leadership at each contracting squadron at JBSA, the problems 
and frustrations experienced would have increased exponentially.   
Another strength found was the effort and attention on strategic sourcing at JBSA.  
This strength surfaced in two areas.  First, the contracting specific COLS for JBSA 
included finding strategic sourcing opportunities by consolidating contracts between the 
three geographic locations.  The second piece of evidence emerged in the coding process 
as there were co-occurrences between strategic sourcing acting in a positive manner.  
This strength fits in perfect accord with one of the goals of BRAC, cost savings (Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). 
The communication between the three contracting squadrons at JBSA created 
another identifiable strength.  This strength surfaced through coding interviews, as many 
individuals identified communication, specifically, communication within and between 
the contracting squadrons, as strengths.  Communication enables effective consolidation 
as evidenced by multiple theories in the literature review.   
Another strength which surfaced during interviews of JBSA employees was the 
openness of the contracting squadrons themselves.  Multiple contracting employees 
expressed during the interviews (subsequently coded) that the contracting organization 
kept an open mind throughout the changes in an effort to fulfill the mission.  As 
evidenced in the literature review, openness helps the consolidation process meet its 
goals and objectives.   
The final strength identified at JBSA was a means to provide effective feedback.  
The ability to provide feedback is directly in line with the findings of Donaldson (2001) 
and discussed in the literature review.  Interviewees who responded to question #48 




prior to and since joint basing occurred.  Although the ability to provide feedback 
previously existed, JBSA employees did not hold a unanimous belief that feedback 
provided received significant attention.   
Unfortunately for everyone, the weaknesses of JBSA eclipsed the strengths 
throughout the interviews.  The most prevalent problem at JBSA was in the 
communication of the contracting squadrons with wing leadership and its customers.  
Several examples surfaced of the poor communication during planning, stand-up, and 
after FOC.  The fact that some individuals received absolutely no information prior the 
creation of JBSA, some customers found themselves contractually abandoned during 
stand-up, and others did not know where to turn after FOC was perceived as 
unacceptable.  Multiple theories throughout the literature review stressed the importance 
of communication, but despite the warnings, JBSA fell well short of good communication 
with wing leadership and its customers.   
Another of the most frequently voiced frustrations at JBSA across all geographic 
locations and all interviewee categories was task uncertainty.  As evidenced in the coding 
and answers to questions, enormous task uncertainty existed, specifically with the 
creation of the 502nd Contracting Squadron.  These uncertainties created untold conflict 
between individuals across JBSA at every level.  Gresov (1990) warned of the pitfalls of 
task uncertainty, but as evidenced across hours of interviews, JBSA again failed to avoid 
the hazard.   
The organizational structure of three separate contracting offices employed at 
JBSA created a weakness which few interviewees identified.  In fact, many of the 
contracting employees, specifically contracting leadership for JBSA, called the separate 
units a strength in the joint-basing process (personal communication, June 13, 2011; 
personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011).  The 
employed organizational structure likely acted as a strength for both contracting and 
supported units from the perspective of effective contracting.  However, it failed to 
support the overall BRAC goals, specifically, monetary savings through redundant 
personnel reductions.  Furthermore, three separate contracting organizations made 
strategic sourcing more difficult compared to a single, unified contracting organization. 
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Culture shock also existed across JBSA, specifically at Fort Sam Houston.  As 
stated in the literature review, when merging cultures differ significantly, the 
organizations will feel the negative impacts of culture shock (Creasy et al., 2009).  Nearly 
all respondents at Fort Sam Houston recognized and identified the difference in cultures 
between the Army and the Air Force.  At JBSA, according to the coding and interviews, 
the indications that culture acted as a barrier occurred with five times the frequency of 
those who viewed the culture as an enabler for successful consolidation.  Culture shock 
can and did act as a barrier to the effective consolidation efforts at JBSA. 
One important explanation as to why JBSA encountered the problems it did 
throughout the consolidation process was wing leadership.  Several examples surfaced 
during interviews of instances in which wing leadership failed.  Employees in the 
contracting workforce experienced numerous instances in which a contract process 
required the wing leadership’s signature before an action could occur.  However, after the 
creation of JBSA, the wing leadership became one-third as accessible and it became three 
times more difficult to obtain signatures.  Furthermore, some interviewees specifically 
called out the newly created wing staff as simply barriers blocking access to the 
commander.  Without a strong leader championing the consolidation, other important 
enablers of effective consolidation never materialized. 
These important missing enablers included a lack of a shared vision, adaptability, 
formalization, positive emotional attractors, empowered employees, and decentralization.  
The wing leadership either never created a shared vision or failed to communicate the 
shared vision they developed.  Without a shared vision, the JBSA employees had few, if 
any, positive emotional attractors towards consolidation.  Furthermore, with mass 
uncertainties abounding because of poor planning, no processes formalized and no 
employee empowerment occurred.  No decentralization could occur with the decision 
maker or responsible party often unknown.  Finally, rather than being flexible and 
adaptable at the wing staff level, multiple examples in the interviews surfaced of mass 
confusion and refusal by the staff to work around their ever-changing processes.  
At JBLM, the strengths discovered were also internal to the contracting function.  
One of the strengths discovered within the MICC was the ability to provide effective 
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feedback.  The literature review clearly shows the importance of effective feedback and 
identified it as an enabler of adapting organizations to new environments.  No 
respondents stated that they could not provide effective feedback, and many said that they 
had a mechanism to provide feedback.  However, some interviewees did not believe the 
feedback resulted in any changes while others believed its effectiveness. 
Another strength found at JBLM was the openness within the contracting unit.  
Numerous contracting personnel showed during their interviews that the member’s 
contracting organization was very open and willing to allow discussion and did not 
prevent individuals from giving opinions (personal communication, June 13, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  The willingness to change based on inputs was 
not seen as readily, but several interviewees did state that it occurred.  Senge (1990) 
showed openness as essential for transitioning organizations to adapt to their new 
environments.   
Adaptability was another strength discovered during interviews at JBLM.  Many 
employees, both those coming from the Air Force and those remaining with the Army, 
stated that the transition of the contracting unit went much more smoothly than the 
process for the base as a whole (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  The coding showed that more people experienced 
adaptability as a barrier than an enabler, but the negative views were exclusively related 
to the broad joint-basing effort, not to the MICC specifically, while the positive views 
were almost entirely focused on the MICC.  The literature review showed that when 
present, adaptability was clearly an enabler of consolidation. 
A major difference that was found between JBSA and JBLM was that the JBLM 
did not experience significant culture shock during the consolidation.  Many interviewees 
from outside of contracting had culture shock within their organizations and many 
contracting personnel saw it in other units, but the MICC remained insulated (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal 
communication, June 15, 2011; personal communication, June 16, 2011).  The literature 
showed the absence of culture shock to be an enabler of consolidation; thus, we 
determined that the lack of culture shock in the JBLM MICC was a strength. 
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Another strength found at JBLM was the relatively low levels of conflict.  Similar 
to patterns seen in culture shock above, interviews of personnel outside of the MICC 
showed significantly higher incidents of conflict than occurred in the MICC.  Contracting 
personnel consistently reported that levels of conflict were not significantly different 
from levels experienced prior to joint basing (personal communication, June 13, 2011; 
personal communication, June 14, 2011; personal communication, June 15, 2011; 
personal communication, June 16, 2011).  The literature review shows that conflict often 
appears during major transitions and limits the performance of the affected organization.  
Because of this, the lack of significant conflict was a strength for JBLM. 
The final strength identified at JBLM was the leadership in both contracting 
organizations prior to consolidation and the combined leadership of the MICC following 
the consolidation.  This strength emerged through interviews with contracting personnel 
and emerged consistently (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  The leadership from both the Air Force and Army sides 
effectively ensured that their subordinates understood the purpose of the changes and 
how they would be impacted by issues within the control of the contracting unit.  Many 
interviewees attributed other identified strengths, such as a shared vision, lack of culture 
shock, and lack of conflict, to the success of the contracting leadership.  The leadership 
proved instrumental in limiting barriers, promoting enablers and helping the contracting 
transition go more smoothly than much of the rest of the consolidation.  
While there were numerous strengths in the approach used by JBLM, weaknesses 
existed as well.  The first was the lack of focus on strategic sourcing.  Chen et al. (2004) 
showed that viewing purchasing as a strategic function was a major factor that 
determined the success of strategic sourcing efforts which then directly impacted firm 
performance.  There were no coded co-occurrences of strategic sourcing with any other 
concepts in the transcripts of interviews at JBLM.  During the interviews, it often 
appeared that the final goal for joint basing was the creation of a joint base, not to further 
the objectives of the BRAC law (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  This consolidation provided the opportunity for the 
contracting function to show its strategic value by providing not only quantity discounts 
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on purchases being made and decreased transaction costs from fewer contracts, but 
proactive support for strategic objectives that improve both effectiveness and efficiency.  
While JBLM accomplished the goal of creating a joint base contracting unit, it 
squandered an opportunity for significant improvement in support for the base.   
External communication was also a significant weakness for the JBLM MICC.  
Customers identified this weakness during interviews, and the coding revealed that 
communication was the most negative area of JBLM.  Both Air Force and Army 
customers shared similar complaints about not knowing who to contact.  Air Force 
customers also experienced difficulty with receiving information on contracting 
processes that differed from the Air Force processes (June 15, 2011; personal 
communication, June 16, 2011).  These could be customer service process problems, but 
based on the fact that customers prior to consolidation stated that they did not have any of 
these problems, it was likely these issues were symptoms of a communication problem 
because the processes did not change.  Covin and Kilmann (1990) talked about the 
negative results of a lack of communication. 
Similar to JBSA, one of the most common frustrations at JBLM was the task 
uncertainty.  In the coding and interviews, we discovered that task uncertainty was 
prevalent throughout the joint base, including in the contracting function.  However, task 
uncertainty failed to present itself at the tactical, contract execution level.  The task 
uncertainty led to inefficiencies and a general lack of direction that surfaced especially in 
the way the contracting personnel viewed their organization’s position on the base, not 
how they viewed their job or role within the contracting function.  The literature review 
clearly showed that task uncertainty was a barrier to successful consolidations; therefore, 
it was an obvious weakness in the process at JBLM. 
Another weakness discovered at JBLM was the lack of education for customers 
who transitioned from the Air Force to the Army or remained in the Air Force but are 
now supported by Army contracting.  Interviews with current and former Air Force 
customers revealed the issue.  Although the MICC provided training (personal 
communication, June 14, 2011), it clearly did not reach everyone who needed it.  This 
lack of training was especially true of Air Force customers who remained Air Force 
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employees after joint basing (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  One Air Force 
customer stated that the first guidance they received was a guide for the end of the fiscal 
year that came out seven months after FOC.  This weakness was very similar to the 
communication issues discussed in the previous paragraph and was a weakness because it 
could lead to similarly negative results. 
The next weakness we discovered was the lack of use of best practices.  This 
problem was not specific to the MICC but resulted from high level policy requiring the 
joint bases to follow the policy of the lead Service (personal communication, June 13, 
2011).  The consistent use of Army policy disappointed many former Air Force 
employees who said they received briefings saying that JBLM would implement the best 
policy (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 
2011).  Many Air Force employees stated that the use of certain Air Force policies 
instead of Army policies would reduce acquisition lead times and make the contracting 
process more efficient (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal 
communication, June 14, 2011).  Flexibility was identified as a component of adaptability 
in the literature review; thus, while the adaptability of the MICC was a strength, the lack 
of flexibility in policy for the entire joint-basing process was a weakness.   
The last few weaknesses identified at JBLM were concepts that did not emerge 
during interviews but which the literature review showed to be enablers when present and 
barriers when absent.  Thus, the absence of these concepts was a weakness.  These 
concepts include the lack of formalization, the lack of positive emotional attractors, the 
lack of empowered employees, and the lack of positive culture change.  The interviews 
included people within the contracting office as well as customers from other functional 
areas, and none of these concepts showed up in either category. 
After thoroughly examining the interviews, coding, and highlighted answers to 
questions, we propose causal relationships exist at JBSA and JBLM.  The conflict and 
performance issues (which included the contracting function surfaced at both bases after 
consolidation) stem from two fundamental problems.  First, base leadership considered 
contracting an administrative function rather than as strategic.  Second, goal 
incongruence between BRAC’s intentions and joint basing execution abounded.  As 
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discovered in the literature review, Chen et al. (2004) explains the pivotal importance of 
contracting’s role being at least partially strategic in nature.  Without this view by senior 
leadership at both bases, change efforts struggled and future change efforts will struggle 
as well.  Additionally, Swaminathan et al. (2008) explains how a shared goal is 
paramount in any consolidation effort, and the goals of BRAC differ from the goals of 
joint basing.  This lack of a shared goal implies that joint basing could never meet the 
intentions of BRAC on its current path.  The other weaknesses experienced were unique 
to each base and branch from different root problems.  Figure 8 shows the causal diagram 
that represents what our research suggests about the issues experienced by JBSA and 
JBLM, where the size of the shape is indicative of the severity of the problem, the 
vertical scale represents likelihood of success or failure, and the linkage arrows show 






































Figure 8.   JBSA and JBLM Causal Diagram 
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As identified in the discussion, both goal congruence and the consideration of 
contracting as an administrative function by senior leadership are the root causes of the 
problems experienced at JBSA and JBLM.  On the JBSA side of the diagram, those root 
causes directly aided in the mass task uncertainty which followed FOC and the lack of a 
shared vision.  Furthermore, the organizational structure employed at JBSA failed to 
align with the overall goals of BRAC.  The task uncertainty then caused even more 
communication breakdowns and problems with the customers and wing leadership at 
JBSA as evidenced in the co-occurrences during coding.  Also evidenced in the coding 
was the fact that the poor communication and different styles of communication as fueled 
the culture shock.  However, the good communication internal to the Contracting 
Squadrons helped increase the likelihood of success at JBSA by focusing the Contracting 
Squadrons on strategic sourcing and showing employees the leadership skills of the 
Contracting Squadron leaders.   
On the JBLM side of the diagram, both root causes similarly contributed to the 
task uncertainty, and the view of contracting as an administrative function by base 
leadership was a significant cause of the lack of focus on strategic sourcing.  Significant 
problems in communication also led to an increase in the task uncertainty experienced at 
JBSA.  The interview coding supported this conclusion as communication and task 
uncertainty had the second-most co-occurrences of any concepts found in interviews at 
JBLM.  Task uncertainty also likely contributed to the lack of strategic sourcing focus.  
The concepts did not co-occur at all, which points to the lack of focus on strategic 
sourcing.  The interviews showed that the task uncertainty made it difficult for the 
consolidating organizations to accomplish anything; thus, they did not implement any 
programs that were not specifically directed or measured, including strategic sourcing.  
On the positive side, contracting personnel consistently credited their leadership with 
reducing culture shock and conflict within the contracting office.  The lack of culture 
shock also helped to further reduce the incidence of conflict, an idea evidenced by the 
significant numbers of co-occurrences between culture and conflict. 
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5. Will the Employed Processes, Governance Structures, Organizational 
Structures, and Communication Lines Be Successful?   
It is impossible to say with certainty whether any processes or structures will be 
successful, but both joint bases have been established and reached FOC.  The 
requirement of the BRAC process was to establish joint bases with the lead service 
providing installation support for the entire joint base (Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission, 2005).  That requirement has been achieved through mandate 
of FOC by October 1, 2010, but there have been difficulties at both bases and each 
organization continues to adapt to its new environment. 
Beyond the minimum requirement of establishing the joint bases, they should also 
support the objectives of the BRAC process: $183.8 million in cost savings, 
transformation, improvement of capabilities, and enhancement of military value (Defense 
Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005).  We discovered no metrics being 
used at the joint bases which addressed the goals of transformation, capabilities 
improvement, or enhancement of military value.  Furthermore, we did not find any 
strategies set forth by leadership to achieve these ends.  The only BRAC goal addressed 
by either joint base was cost savings, which numerous contracting personnel at JBSA saw 
as the goal of joint basing.  A DoD committee with membership from each Service 
developed the COLS for multiple functions, including contracting.  At each joint base, 
the base leadership holds the functional leadership responsible for achieving the COLS, 
but the COLS failed to address the fundamental purpose of joint basing which was to 
support the objectives of BRAC.  Table 9 lists the COLS used to measure the contracting 
function.  
Beyond the minimum requirement of establishing the joint bases, they should also 
support the objectives of the BRAC process: cost savings, transformation, improvement 
of capabilities, and enhancement of military value (Defense Base Closure and 
Realignment Commission, 2005).  We discovered no metrics being used at the joint bases 
which addressed the goals of transformation, capabilities improvement, or enhancement 
of military value.  Furthermore, we did not find any strategies set forth by leadership to 
achieve these ends.  The only BRAC goal addressed by either joint base was cost savings, 
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and this goal was not specific, measureable, nor addressed in their performance briefings.  
The DoD created Common Output Level Standards (COLS) for all of the joint bases.  
JBSA and JBLM base leadership continuously monitor the COLS for multiple functions 
across the joint base, including contracting.  The base leadership holds the functional 
leadership responsible for achieving and reporting on the status of the COLS. JBSA and 
JBLM used COLS for measuring customer satisfaction and measureable performance.  
The problem with the COLS was that they were baselined off of pre-consolidation levels 
of average service across several distinct bases and generally expect only the 
maintenance of a given level of performance, not improvement from it. 
Table 9.   Contracting COLS 
COLS 
Returned customer surveys will achieve an average rating of 
at least a "3" on a 5 point scale 
Customer surveys will be conducted on at least 20% of 
awarded actions  
For large acquisitions, 70% of procurement awards meet the 
agreed upon milestone plan for procurement lead time  
70% of actions awarded using simplified acquisition 
procedures have a procurement lead time of 30 days or less 
Conduct surveillance of each GPC Approving Official at least 
every 12 months, 100% of the time  
Ensure that 100% of initial and refresher GPC training is 
conducted 
 
C. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
The 12 DoD joint bases currently scattered all across the world all have at least 
one contracting organization.  This research provides insight as to how those contracting 
organizations can be improved.  Furthermore, this research also provides important 
considerations that other consolidating or consolidated purchasing activities should keep 
in mind.  Additionally, governmental entities considering consolidating purchasing 
functions should consider the results of those consolidated so far to determine whether or 
not the move is prudent for their unique situation.   
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Based upon the answers to the research questions above, contracting activities at 
any consolidated location can better plan for and execute contract consolidation activities.  
Furthermore, any governmental entity consolidating its purchasing arm should look to 
avoid the pitfalls which occurred at JBSA and JBLM and should seek to emulate their 
successes.  JBSA and JBLM can improve the way they are contributing to meeting the 
overall goals of BRAC—cost savings, transformation, improvement of capabilities, and 
enhancement of military value by following the recommendations set forth below 
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005). 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
Specific recommendations for both joint bases come from combining the 
interview results with the literature review.  JBSA has a unique geographical structure 
which makes it very much unlike several other joint base initiatives.  JBSA is 
geographically separated across San Antonio, Texas making their connection seem as 
though it is really in name only.  The general feeling across all three bases was that the 
different locations hurt efficiencies, especially in non-mission critical operations 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  One JBSA Randolph employee said  
Well we talked about the inefficiencies of just being geographically 
separated.  It is totally inefficient … I mean anytime there is a ceremony 
or every time there is a promotion I mean we have to truck to go to 
Lackland, we have to truck down to go to Fort Sam, they have to truck 
them over here, so you have got half a day of … the wing getting on a bus, 
trucking to Lackland staying there half a day. (personal communication, 
June 15, 2011)   
This statement was backed-up by a JBSA Lackland employee who complained that 
Now for meetings if you are going to have a meeting with any of those 
individuals you have to determine where it is going to be and somebody is 
going to have to travel across town whether that be Randolph or Fort Sam. 
(personal communication, June 13, 2011)   
The first recommendation for improvement is to utilize available alternative 
methods (online collaborative meetings, video calls, telephone calls, E-mail, and others) 
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to significantly reduce the number of face-to-face meetings and thousands of wasted 
man-hours annually.  Furthermore, requiring entire organizations to attend events like 
changes of command ceremonies and promotion ceremonies should be removed given 
the tremendous expenditure of resources with little to no return.   
The second recommendation for JBSA concerns the utter lack of a true feeling of 
consolidation at two of the three bases which make up JBSA.  Common quotes from 
JBSA contracting leaders, contracting employees, and customers at Randolph AFB and 
Lackland AFB included the following: “Joint basing hasn’t really hit us yet” (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011), “We don’t even see it.  It is not an impact” (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011), “Nothing was really affected” (personal communication, 
June 15, 2011), and “I haven’t really noticed anything different” (personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  Considering two-thirds of the purchasing squadrons felt 
like nothing happened, it isn’t any wonder why they feel as though “trucking” over to a 
different part of the base is a complete waste of time.  Furthermore, it should come as no 
surprise that while two squadrons feel as though nothing has changed, one organization is 
left to feel all the pain of consolidation.  The recommendation to combat this current 
situation is through improved communication by wing leadership and creating buy-in by 
all the purchasing units.  The three contracting squadrons already initiated improved 
communication lines, knowledge sharing activities, and fostered a good teamwork 
relationship.  However, because wing leadership has not recognized or supported these 
activities, they exist only on a very informal level.  A true shared vision and mission with 
goals and objectives is needed at JBSA along with improved wing support and 
leadership. 
Third, JBSA must continue working to reduce and eliminate task uncertainty.  
Countless examples of the lack of preparation and execution of the joint base stand-up 
exist (personal communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011; 
personal communication, June 15, 2011).  The complete failure by wing leadership in 
planning for the transition with consideration to contracting was obvious through hours of 
interviews.  One JBSA employee commented that everything done on each base before is 
now completed via “triplication of effort” (personal communication, June 13, 2011).  A 
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high ranking customer of JBSA complained that the 502nd Contracting Squadron at Fort 
Sam Houston, “should have been fully staffed months before the actual transition from 
Army to Air Force contracting services” (personal communication, June 14, 2011).  
Unfortunately, this was also a failure in wing leadership because JBSA contracting 
leaders repeatedly requested this very idea only to have it denied.  One JBSA contracting 
leader voiced frustration over this very point saying that “They always thought that they 
had bigger fish to fry…they didn’t worry about contracting” (personal communication, 
June 15, 2011).  The third recommendation to avoid the frustrations experienced by 
JBSA in the future and to minimize them currently is to include contracting at the 
strategic level.  Planning and execution of contractual changes will happen more 
smoothly if someone presents a contracting perspective at a strategic level.  However, 
because the current military structure views contracting as a supporting administrative 
function and not as a strategic partner, until the structure changes to include contracting 
at a strategic level, these uncertainties and problems will likely persist.   
The final recommendation for JBSA involves a study on radically changing the 
organizational structure employed at JBSA.  The goals of BRAC which include cost 
savings, transformation, improvement of capabilities, and enhancement of military value 
(Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, 2005) have not been met at JBSA 
under the current organizational structure.  Rather than organizing and operating as three 
separate entities, a study should be conducted to determine whether one MSG instead of 
three would better benefit JBSA.  This study should look at ensuring the BRAC goals 
align with the joint base goals and evaluate it against the current organizational structure 
which does not appear to be meeting any of the intentions of BRAC.  It is unknown 
whether the current structure best fits the environment to maximize performance 
(Donaldson, 2001), but it is unlikely given the current outputs.   
The interviews showed one weakness of JBLM was a lack of communication and 
training with the new customers that they supported because of joint basing.  Contracting 
personnel stated that they provided training to their new customers but multiple 
customers stated that they did not receive any training in the Army processes.  It is 
possible that this was an oversight specific to the consolidation process, but the fact that 
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contracting is a tenant unit on JBLM and does not fall under the garrison command may 
make integration more difficult.  This is further complicated by the fact that the 
contracting office supports a significant number of Air Force customers that are 
unfamiliar with Army contracting procedures.   
Because of these difficulties, the first recommendation is that specific training 
should be provided to all incoming commanders and resource advisors.  The training 
should provide contact information for the various functions within the unit and ensure 
familiarity with the contracting processes, procedures for submitting requirements, and 
normal timelines for executing requirements.  Additional training should be made 
available to new Air Force personnel who will interact with contracting that highlights 
the procedural differences between contracting in the Army and in the Air Force.  New 
training should ensure that customers have a basic knowledge of how contracting works 
and what they should expect from their interactions.  The knowledge gained from training 
should alleviate some of the frustration and difficulty of the contracting consolidation 
process and should ensure that the units of JBLM receive the support they require. 
The second recommendation for JBLM is to focus on TCO rather than strictly 
contract consolidation and changes in contract price.  Numerous interviews showed that 
the focus of JBLM contracting was on contract consolidation alone, with the hope that 
cost savings and improvements in mission support would come later (personal 
communication, June 13, 2011; personal communication, June 14, 2011).  A careful 
consideration of TCO would ensure that the government used its resources in the best 
way possible, not just a fair and reasonable price on an individual contract.  This analysis 
should also be used in decisions about whether to use contractors or government 
personnel and similar make or buy decisions.   
A third recommendation for JBLM is in response to the lack of a strategic focus 
on contracting.  A major roadblock to efficiencies that strategic sourcing can bring about 
is the view of purchasing as a purely administrative function (Ellram & Carr, 1994).  
Contracting has the potential to add significant strategic value to JBLM but must 
proactively pursue the opportunity to participate in strategic planning and ensure that 
contracting decisions and processes support the strategic goals of the base.  The 
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regulations and procedures limit the tools available but do not eliminate the potential for 
cost savings and improved service that can translate into more effective mission 
accomplishment.  The contracting leadership must be proactive in pursuing strategic 
opportunities as well as actively educating their superiors on the potential mission impact 
contracting can provide.  Other contracting personnel, both pre-award and post-award, 
should also look for opportunities to gain efficiencies by conducting spend analyses to 
find potential targets for strategic sourcing.  Pre-award personnel should use analysis 
tools, such as Kraljic’s (1983) Purchasing Portfolio Matrix, to help determine acquisition 
strategies and the degree of relationship management that the supplier requires.  Post-
award personnel should understand the criticality of the contracts that they administer, 
and should ensure that they maintain relationships with important suppliers.  These are 
very basic strategic sourcing ideas but may help prove the value of contracting in a 
strategic context and help to provide efficiencies that improve support and save money 
for JBLM. 
The final four recommendations apply to JBSA, JBLM and all other DoD 
consolidation efforts.  First, the BRAC Commission estimated that joint basing would 
bring about cost savings of $183.8 million per year and reduce the workforce by 2,121 
personnel.  This equated to expected savings of approximately $86,000 per position 
reduced per year.  Based on this number, it was likely that the bulk of the expected 
savings were to come from reduced personnel costs.  However, neither JBSA nor JBLM 
experienced reduction in civilian personnel authorizations in significant amounts.  The 
first recommendation for all DoD consolidations is to eliminate any positions that are 
made redundant or unnecessary because of joint basing.  The elimination of these 
positions would reduce costs without a loss of capability and would be a significant step 
towards supporting the BRAC objectives, which is the purpose of the joint-basing 
initiatives. 
Second, the COLS used by DoD to measure the output of joint bases do not 
properly hold the consolidating organizations accountable for the desired outcomes.  As a 
result, the Services created joint bases but did not support the overarching goals of BRAC 
because they were not accountable for achieving them.  The final recommendation is that 
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DoD should align the goals of consolidating units with the goals of BRAC by creating 
measureable, objective criteria that support the higher level goals and hold base 
commanders responsible for meeting these criteria.  This would force the consolidating 
units to focus on more than simply becoming a joint base, but also ensure that the 
consolidations are made with their intended goals in mind.  Placing the responsibility for 
these goals on commanders will compel them to pursue a consolidation that is more 
closely aligned with the spirit of BRAC instead of the current situation that only requires 
that the joint bases reach FOC.   
Tied closely to the second recommendation of goal alignment is the third 
suggestion giving repercussions for failing to meet congressionally directed savings.  The 
BRAC legislation gives precise savings goals for the joint bases, and it is unknown 
whether any savings have occurred because of consolidations.  Congress should first 
stipulate specific outcomes by date and then direct a GAO study into the joint bases’ 
achievement of meeting savings goals every two or three years.  Based on the results of 
the GAO studies of monetary savings compared to specific congressional outcomes from 
the joint bases, budgetary reductions commensurate with costs of creating the joint bases 
should occur if required savings have not been achieved.  A simultaneous approach could 
be to require the joint bases to post and account for all savings online on a public forum.  
The current process of a complete disregard of the overall purpose of BRAC by the DoD 
is irresponsible to a taxpaying public and undermines the intentions of Congress. 
The final recommendation is that the DoD develops a joint change management 
core competency unit, which should include a BRAC arm.  Since budgetary pressures 
will persist and another round of BRAC may occur, this recommendation may have far-
reaching consequences.  This organization should be made up of change champions 
throughout the DoD including active duty and civilians.  This organization would have 
several benefits including the ability to avoid many of the hazards that befall changing 
DoD organizations like JBSA and JBLM.  For example, prior to FOC at JBSA and 
JBLM, a change management organization would have realized that appropriate process 
lanes and outcome responsibilities needed to be established, unlike what occurred at 
JBSA and JBLM.  They would have required pilot tests or dry runs, normally considered 
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best practices, before the premature declarations of FOC at JBSA and JBLM.  
Furthermore, this organization should save the DoD significant money by aiding in the 
seemingly endless change processes, ensuring that current change direction (like BRAC) 
is implemented correctly, and finally save money by precluding payments to consultants 
to perform work which the government should have expertise to accomplish internally. 
E. LIMITATIONS  
Although our research has broad implications for the consolidation of purchasing 
activities, it is not without limits.  The largest and most obvious limitation of this study is 
that it only looked at two of the twelve existing joint bases.  In addition to only having 
two of the twelve joint bases, JBSA and JBLM were both a part of the final round of joint 
basing.  If information sharing occurred between the bases, the performance of JBSA and 
JBLM should have been the smoothest of the 12 joint basing initiatives.  Although 
lessons learned should have been available to JBSA and JBLM decision-makers, one 
JBSA employee complained that they received no lessons learned despite the fact that 
this had been done before numerous times (personal communication, June 14, 2011).   
In addition to the limitations of only considering a small portion of the joint bases, 
another limitation is the DoD specific outlook on the consolidations.  Although the 
lessons learned in our report apply to any purchasing function consolidation, the focus is 
military specific.  In order to apply perfectly to other activities, the study requires a more 
broad inclusion of other governmental or private firms.  This idea was summarized by 
one interviewee who remarked that “The problem with … using their lessons learned is 
again it is like politics.  All politics are local” (personal communication, June 15, 2011).  
While the vast majority of this study applies to any other governmental departments, 
state, or local purchasing functions, issues specific to DoD exist which may curtail the 
ability to generalize the findings beyond a DoD context.   
Another limitation to our research rested on the fact that both JBSA and JBLM 
are less than one year old.  As such, they have very little contracting activity from which 
to draw adequate contract performance analysis.  At the time of the interviews, both 
JBSA and JBLM were in the process of consolidating contracts and finding areas for 
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efficiencies.  However, given the differing structures and completion dates for different 
contracts, even when opportunities exist for efficiencies, it takes time before the 
implementation of the efficiency actions.  
The final limitation of this study is that it relied only on the opinions of those in or 
directly tied to the purchasing functions at each joint base.  These individuals may have a 
perception about the purchasing functions that is too close to mission execution at the 
lowest levels to be objective.  These individuals may focus too much on the difficult 
details and not see the successes in the larger picture.  To say it another way, they may 
suffer from the old adage of not being able to see the forest because of the trees.  Because 
we conducted this case study using a qualitative approach to answering our research 
questions, personal biases or personalities may have impacted the interview results.   
F. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the process of answering the research questions, other questions arose—
answers to which may be useful to current and future research leaders of consolidation 
and change.  The first, and most obvious, area for future study is a quantitative study 
examining whether any of the projected savings have come to fruition because of joint 
basing.  This study would include, but not be limited to, monetary savings, fewer contract 
actions, less headcount, and other administrative support required.  However, as 
previously mentioned, this study could not be adequately completed until the joint bases 
have more time to operate.  Instead, a study of the more mature joint bases could be done 
to find what, if any, efficiencies have been found because of the joint base initiative and 
how long it takes to reap efficiencies after consolidating a purchasing organization.   
Another important area for further research would be the idea of contract unit 
consolidation compared to remaining separate contracting organizations.  JBSA 
maintained three separate, distinct purchasing organizations whereas JBLM moved to a 
single purchasing unit.  Because this study only examined two bases, no conclusions 
could be reached based on the differences in consolidation of contracting units.  This 
same idea of other factors playing a role could be applied to geographically separate 
versus connected joint base studies as well.  Finally, another similar study comparing 
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results when different Services have the lead would be beneficial to the field and help to 
make improvements across all DoD joint bases. 
One final area for potential research involves comparing the BRAC goals to the 
joint base actions.  Determining why or how joint base leaders deviated from BRAC 
goals would serve as a valuable study as well.  Tied directly to the question of deviating 
from BRAC goals could include Congressional interest.  Specifically, asking how 
Congress can better ensure that future and current consolidation implementation 
coincides with the original intent and goals put forth by Congress.  Finally, asking how 
accountability can be instilled throughout the change process may be an area of interest 
for lawmakers. 
G. SUMMARY  
The comparison of JBSA and JBLM provides a view of two very different 
approaches to contracting consolidation, led by two different Services.  Utilizing a case 
study approach, this research identified specific factors that acted as barriers to their 
consolidation as well as those that contributed to the organizational successes of joint 
base contracting.  The operations of JBSA and JBLM were compared and contrasted with 
each other as well as with concepts identified in the review of the academic literature.  
This comparison allowed for the identification of strengths and weaknesses of both 
approaches.  Whereas lessons learned from this case study are not perfectly generalizable 
to other situations, it provides an opportunity to see the types of challenges that future 
consolidations may encounter.   
One JBSA employee may have summarized it best by saying, “The overall 
concept is good, but how well it’s being implemented is another story” (personal 
communication, June 15, 2011).  There are many people at both JBSA and JBLM that 
believe joint basing is a sound idea that will provide benefits to the military in the future, 
but acknowledge that current struggles with the transition exist.  The consolidation 
process is complicated, and the joint bases only recently reached FOC; many challenges 
remain.  It would be easy for organizations and personnel to get discouraged as the 
process progresses with little efficiencies to show for the effort thus far.  As the processes 
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mature, it is possible that the consolidation will make the joint bases more efficient as 
well as more effective in their mission accomplishment.   
The government incurred significant costs of approximately $50.6 million in its 
creation of joint bases, including JBSA and JBLM.  Industry would have tracked costs 
and be expecting a return on investment, but the government has not.  The costs and 
projected savings of creating these joint bases were high, and the joint bases are not 
currently fully meeting the goals of BRAC as laid forth by Congress.  If the issues 
currently facing JBSA and JBLM fail to be adequately addressed, a case of déjà vu may 
surface, particularly at JBSA.  Just as SACC and SARPMA failed over 20 years earlier, 
the military may have failed to learn from its past mistakes and another disestablishment 
of a joint effort may occur.  If so, the DoD would have little credibility with its 
employees and the public for providing intended results of consolidations.  This 
consideration begs the larger question of whether or not the joint base portion of BRAC 
should continue if nobody is accountable for delivering results.   
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 Questions Contracting Personnel 
Contracting 
Leadership Customers 
Demographic and General Questions 
1 How many years of functional experience do you have? X X X 
2 For which service do you currently work?  Did this change because of consolidation? X X X 
3 What is your current position?  How long have you held this position?  Did this change because of consolidation? X X X 
4 Are you a supervisor or rater?  Did this change because of consolidation? X X X 
5 Are you currently warranted?  Did this change because of consolidation? X X  
6 
How would you define success for contracting in the joint base 
environment (fewer contract actions, monetary savings, better 
contracting support/customer service)?  What, if anything, would 
you change to bring about that success(es) (reduce workforce, pre-
acquisition planning, training)? 
X X X 
7 
What contracting efficiencies have been achieved through joint 
basing and how do you measure those efficiencies?  Do you think 
others will come? 
X X X 
8 
What do you see as the objectives of joint basing  (number of 
actions, dollar value, dollars/action, number of modifications, 
number of protests, customer satisfaction)?  Do you believe joint 
basing will achieve its intended objectives?  Why or why not? 
X X X 
Governance Structures Questions 
9 
Where did this contracting unit fit into the base before joint basing 
occurred? Was this an appropriate fit for mission completion?  Is 
there an available organization chart from this time? 
X X  
10 
Where does contracting unit fit into the base now that joint basing 
has occurred? Is this an appropriate fit for mission completion?  Is 
there an available organization chart? 
X X  
11 
What are the strengths and weaknesses to changes in structure? 
(division of labor, informal communication, formal hierarchy, 
standardization (processes, outputs, skills), span of control, 
centralization, formalization), mechanistic vs. organic) 
X X  
12 
What, if anything, would you change to make your unit fit more 
appropriately into the joint base structure?  How would these 
changes improve fit? 
X X  
13 
Was your chain of command well-defined?  How many supervisors 
did you report to and what were their positions?  Was your direct 
supervisor also your rater?  If not, who was your rater and what was 
his/her position? 
X X  
14 
Is your chain of command well-defined?  How many supervisors do 
you report to and what are their positions?  Is your direct supervisor 
also your rater?  If not, who is your rater and what is his/her 
position? 
X X  
15 Did you have a separate chain of command for contracting authority?  How did this change after joint basing? X X  
16 
Was the prior structure effective? (effective management, balanced 
workload, empower experts to make decisions, facilitates 
communication, unified priorities, customer focused, shared 
resources)? 
X X  
17 
Has the new structure been effective?  Will it be effective in the 
future? (enables workers to be efficient, facilitates successful 
communication, fits culture, fits environment, avoids problems, 





How do you address problems with customers that are not 
cooperating?  Do you address customers from other services 
differently? (talk to them, have your supervisor address them or 
their supervisor, commander to commander, higher commander) 
X X  
19 
Have you observed a higher frequency of conflict since 
consolidation?  If so, please describe. (intensity, subject, inter-
service, cross-functional) 
X X  
20 
Have you observed a change in resource allocation to your 
squadron since consolidation?  If so, please describe. (what 
changed, how it impacts you/your customers, mission) 
X X  
21 Do you anticipate a change in resource allocation to your squadron since consolidation?  If so, please describe. X X  
Contracting Process Questions 
22 What processes changed because of joint basing?  What processes need to change to make joint basing more effective? X X X 
23 
Have the training certifications required for your position changed 
since joint basing?  If so, how? (DAU levels, service specific, any 
positions require specific training (i.e. construction or PBSA)) 
X X  
24 
What was the process flow of receiving requirements prior to joint 
basing?  How were needs described? (customer, finance, 
contracting; thorough description, part numbers, previous 
acquisitions, cost estimates, suppliers, performance based) 
X X  
25 What is the process flow of receiving requirements since joint basing? How are needs described now? X X  
26 
Describe the funding process prior to joint basing.  How has it 
changed? (flow, organization, interaction, forms, computer 
systems) 
X X  
27 
At what level was acquisition planning occurring prior to joint 
basing? (purchase in economic quantities, lease v. buy, time frame 
from requirement definition to award, when does process start for 
reacquisition).  Who was the final authority on these decisions? 
(command level, base level, customer level) 
X X  
28 
At what level does acquisition planning now occur? (purchase in 
economic quantities, lease v. buy, time frame from requirement 
definition to award, when does process start for reacquisition).  
Who is the final authority on these decisions? (command level, base 
level, customer level) 
X X  
29 Who determined acquisition priorities prior to joint basing?  Was it effective? X X  
30 Who determines acquisition priorities since joint basing?  Is this effective? X X  
31 Did requirements integration or consolidation occur prior to joint basing?  Was it effective?  Who was responsible for it? X X  
32 Does requirements integration or consolidation occur since joint basing?  Is it effective?  Who is responsible for it? X X  
33 
Are acquisitions for customers from other services on your base 
treated as interagency acquisitions?  Are there streamlined 
processes for this situation? 
X X  
34 If a situation arises where services have different opinions (contract, legal, etc), how is it resolved? X X  
35 Were the process changes managed efficiently?  How so?  X X  
36 How have these process changes been accepted? X X  







38 Did a strategic communication plan exist for your unit prior to joint basing?  Is a copy available? X X  
39 Does a strategic communication plan exist for your unit since to joint basing?  Is a copy available? X X  
40 
Has the way you communicate with your customer changed since 
joint basing?  If so, how? (e-mail, briefings, through chain of 
command, information overload ) 
X X  
41 How was the process of joint basing communicated to affected employees?  Was it clear? X X  
42 
How were customers educated on changes to the contracting 
processes and how would it affect their requirements?  Was it 
clear? 
X X  
43 
Has the interservice nature of joint basing caused any difficulties 
with communication?  If so, what steps have been taken to 
minimize effects? (explanations of acronyms and jargon, 
procedures) 
X X  
44 Has the way your leadership communicated with you changed since joint basing?  If so, how? X X  
45 Have any steps been taken to help members effectively communicate with other services?   X X  
46 
Has the way you receive feedback changed since joint basing?  If 
so, how?  (how was the feedback given, to whom, by whom, was it 
documented) 
X X  
47 Has the way you give feedback changed since joint basing?  If so, how? X X  
48 
Prior to joint basing, was there a mechanism to give feedback to 
superiors?  Is there now? (How was feedback given, to whom, by 
whom, was it anonymous, did it lead to any changes) 
X X  
Commander/Director Questions 
49 
Have the changes made for joint basing successfully supported the 
purpose of BRAC?  Explain why or why not.  If not, what should 
be done differently to achieve intended outcomes? 
 X  
50 What decisions did you make that directly related to BRAC, and what guidance did you receive?  X  
51 
What actions did you take to prepare your unit for the 
consolidation?  How were they effective?  Was there anything else 
you would have done differently? 
 X  
52 
What barriers did you encounter to joint basing? (resources—
personnel, budget, office space; politics—other commanders 
wanting authority, other services wanting things their way; 
culture—new employees, new customers) 
 X  
53 
Did you have control of the structure of your unit prior to 
consolidation?  Did you decide the structure following 
consolidation?   
 X  
54 
What are the expected outcomes of joint basing?  (monetary 
savings in contract consolidation or personnel reduction, better 
mission support, better community support)  Who is accountable if 
the expected outcomes are not achieved?   
 X  
55 
How will future manning levels be calculated?  Is this different 
from how it was done before joint basing?  Will other services have 
any input into this process?  
 X  
56 How would an element of another service address problems with their contracting support?  X  




58 Do you track any efficiencies gained from joint basing?  Are you aware of anyone else responsible for doing so?  X  
59 If support levels deviate from expectations of the supported service, how is this conflict resolved?      X  
60 How much conflict have you experienced with the other service?  X  
61 Have your employees voiced any frustration with joint basing?  If so, of what nature?  X  
62 What are the issues you have encountered?  How did you resolve them?  X  
63 Have you had any issues with the level of senior support for contracting?    X  
64 
Have you had any issues with the level or quality of pre-award 
support from customers since consolidation?  (timeliness, tech eval 
quality, cost estimates) 
 X  
65 
Have you had any issues with the level or quality of post-
award/administration support from customers since consolidation? 
(number of contracts, number of QAE/COR/inspectors, 
qualifications, contract changes)  
 X  
Customer Questions 
66 From your perspective, how has the contracting process changed as a result of the joint basing consolidation?   X 
67 How has the process for submitting requirements changed as a result of the consolidation?   X 
68 Has the quality, responsiveness, or type of interaction and service with contracting changed since consolidation?  How?   X 
69 Were changes in the contracting process clearly communicated?  Were the changes accurately described?   X 
70 Have lead times changed since the consolidation?  If so, are they better or worse?   X 
71 Overall, have the changes been positive or negative?  Why?   X 
Conclusion Question 
72 What have we not asked that we should know about how joint basing is impacting your unit?   X X X 
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